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

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THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW

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WHO ARE THE MODERNISTS OF THE ENCYCLICAL?

C. A. Briggs: The Encyclical against Modernism (*North American Review*, February, 1908).

A. Loisy: The Gospel and the Church (1902, Eng. tr., 1904); Autour d'un Petit Livre, 1903; Simples Réflexions sur le Décret du Saint Office. *Lamentabili sane exitu*—et sur l'Encyclique, *Pascendi Dominici Gregis*. 1908.

G. Tyrrell: A Much-Abused Letter, 1906; Through Scylla and Charybdis, 1907; The Prospects of Modernism (*Hilbert Jour.*, January, 1908).

X. X. X.: Le Programme des Modernistes: Réplique à l'Encycl. de Pie X: *Pascendi* (translated from the Italian, 1908).

Henry C. Corrance: A Vindication of Modernism (*Nineteenth Century*, February, 1908).

IN the December number of the *Nineteenth Century*, Canon Moyes, of Westminster, answered the two questions: "What is Modernism?" and "Why has the Pope condemned it?" The writer clearly showed that the errors condemned under the name of Modernism strike at the very root not only of Catholicism but also of Christianity as a supernatural religion. Since many of the truths which the Encyclical defends are the common heritage of all Christians, we should expect to find religious-minded Protestants in sympathy with Pius X. against Modernism. Instead of this, there has been a condemnation almost unanimous. The old objection from the case of Galileo and the usual attacks on the Inquisition have been repeated, and, no doubt, the impression has been produced or strengthened that the Roman Church is opposed to modern civilization and to the progress of science. The action of the

Holy Father has been described as "an amazing attempt to recall the Dark Ages." The Encyclical itself and the Syllabus, together with a few Pastoral Letters from the bishops and several articles in Catholic Reviews, have made it plain enough that what the Pope condemns under the name of Modernism is destructive of the Christian faith.

But Catholic reviewers and Catholic bishops, following the example of the Holy Father, have dealt with Modernism impersonally, giving no names or references. Hence the further questions: "Who are the Modernists? Do they really hold the rationalistic views exposed in the Encyclical?" The first question has been answered by public opinion, by the attitude of the Holy See toward some liberal Catholics, and by the leaders of Modernism in England, France, and Italy. Tyrrell, Loisy, and a group of Italian Modernists wrote against the Encyclical as aimed at their opinions. They are recognized as the strongest representatives of the movement.

The attacks on the Encyclical by Modernists, and in the non-Catholic press generally, may be summed up in these two propositions: 1. Some of the errors condemned by the Pope are indeed destructive of Catholicism and Christianity; but they are not held by Modernists; 2. What Modernists do hold is not opposed to the Catholic Faith, but only to an antiquated system of philosophy which Pius X has no right to impose on the faith of Catholics. The issue therefore is not between Modernism and Catholicism but between Modernism and Scholasticism. This is the impression likely to be made on the average reader of nearly all non-Catholic criticisms of the Encyclical, especially of Dr. Briggs's article in the *North American Review* for February.

The tone of his article is very different from that of Dr. Briggs's previous contributions, in which he did not hesitate to admit the divine origin of the primacy of the Pope and to adopt the Catholic interpretation of our Lord's words: "Thou art Peter . . . " There Dr. Briggs, while suggesting reforms—even radical reforms—in the Church, used dignified and respectful expressions: here his language is often violent.

his attacks are personal, his statements given without proof. This article reminds one far less of Dr. Briggs's former articles than of the anonymous assault on "The Policy of Pius X," published last fall. Even Protestant critics of the Roman Curia would not subscribe to such expressions as the following: "They are doing all in their power to stir up strife all over the Christian world with a madness that is the sure precursor of ruin" (p. 200). Again, "The Roman Curia is the canker, the running-sore of the Papacy, which is responsible for all the mischief." "It does not wish the Reunion of Christendom, the peace and unity of the Christian Church." "It is under the sway of four evil spirits, the Spirit of Falsehood, the Spirit of Domination, the Spirit of Avarice, the Spirit of Immobility" (p. 212).

Criticisms of the Encyclical as the work of the Curia are not more moderate. Loisy, Tyrrell, and other Modernists, have been entirely misrepresented. "Their views clearly stated in numerous published writings . . . are wrested and distorted; and then they are held up before the world as guilty of serious errors for these very statements composed by their enemies" (pp. 200, 203). "The Curia blackens their doctrines and characters, and then excommunicates them for being blackened" (p. 203). "The Encyclical is really a trap to catch the unwary . . . The Encyclical virtually dethrones Christ and enthrones St. Thomas as the vicar of Aristotle" (p. 208). Its logical consequences would change the Creed from "One holy, Catholic Church" to "one Roman and Scholastic Church" (p. 207).

How, after such statements, can the writer conclude by declaring: "I have said nothing but what hosts of Catholics of all ranks are saying at the present time?" (p. 212). How few would hold such language not only among Catholics, but among religious-minded and enlightened Protestants!

Another painful impression gathered from the reading of Professor Briggs's article comes from the fact that, in such a grave matter, he should advance and publish very serious charges without giving any proof of or any means of verifying

his statements. In spite of clear evidence to the contrary recently appearing in the London *Tablet*, it is asserted that "The Encyclical intends to classify all the disciples of Newman among the Modernists" (p. 204). Again, what is the excellent authority for the statement ascribed to a Roman Cardinal that "if Newman was now living he would be classed as a heretic"? (p. 205). Is there anything in the attitude of the Church, which made Newman a cardinal, to justify such grave accusations? Does not Tyrrell himself admit that "Newman might have shuddered at his progeny"?[1]

With no better proof, Dr. Briggs brings a still more serious charge against the Holy See when he says: "The treatment of the French episcopate, during the recent troubles, has been most shameful . . . as I have it on excellent authority, their very names were signed to an official document without their knowledge or consent" (p. 211). No one will doubt Dr. Briggs's sincerity in making such a statement, but every one has a right, and perhaps a duty, to question his estimate of the anonymous authority on which he makes it.

As to Dr. Briggs's contention that there is no opposition between the views of Loisy, Tyrrell, etc., and the Catholic faith, any one who is at all familiar with their latest writings, is bound to deny it. "The faith of the Church, according to Catholic doctrine, is a sacred deposit derived from Jesus Christ and His Apostles, whose substance remains unchangeably the same . . . As I understand them, the so-called Modernists agree to that; they accept 'the substance' of Catholic doctrine and reject only its 'scholastic form'" (p. 208-209). This charge, if true, is a most serious one; but is it probable, is it even possible, that in a work which Dr. Briggs himself characterizes as thorough, such a mistake should have been made?

[1] *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1908. The Right Rev. E. T. O'Dwyer, Bishop of Limerick, a lifelong student of Newman's writings, in his recent essay on "Cardinal Newman and the Encyclical," has made it quite evident that there is nothing in Newman to suggest or extenuate the doctrines of the Modernists. This essay has elicited from Pius X a letter of approval, in which Newman's name is freed from the charge of Modernism. (Cf. *Rome*, 28 March.)

What interest could prompt the highest authority in the Church to create a system of erroneous doctrines in order to condemn it? Is it not evident to any one who reads the Encyclical that the Holy Father considers the very foundation of Christianity to be in danger?

However, Dr. Briggs, after a comparison of the errors condemned with the context from which they are taken, comes to the conclusion that those errors are not to be found there.[2] The illustration given on pages 200 and 201, is calculated to bring conviction to all readers who are not familiar with Loisy's book "The Gospel and the Church." Loisy says:

> The twenty-second error of the Syllabus reads as follows: "The dogmas which the Church gives out as revealed are not truths which have fallen down from heaven, but are an interpretation of religious facts, which the human mind has acquired by laborious effort."
>
> Loisy says:[3] "The conceptions that the Church presents as revealed dogmas are not truths fallen from heaven, *and preserved by religious tradition in the precise form in which they first appeared. The historian sees* in them the interpretation of religious facts, acquired by a laborious effort of theological thought. *Though the dogmas may be divine in origin and substance, they are human in structure and composition.*"
>
> This statement of Loisy is careful, accurate, and well-guarded.

It seems clear that by leaving out of the passage the qualifying words printed in italics, its meaning has been changed, and a "careful, accurate and well-guarded statement" has become an heretical proposition. Any one who takes up "The Gospel and the Church" and reads only page 210, will no doubt agree with Dr. Briggs. But this page is but one of the forty-five which make up the section on Catholic Dogma; and any one who has studied this section will come to the conclusion that the words of the Syllabus express Loisy's

[2] It is not maintained that they are taken verbatim from any writer, but the question is, Do they correctly express the thought of the Modernists?

[3] *The Gospel and the Church*, p. 210.

real meaning. If he denied only that our dogmas have come down from heaven in the precise form, or in the terms in which they are expressed in theological definitions; if he admitted that the substance is divine, i. e. divinely revealed, he would only maintain what all Catholic theologians admit. But what does he mean when he says that our dogmas may be divine in their origin? What is his idea of Revelation? It is, according to him, "the consciousness acquired by man of his relations with God."[4] When the book containing this statement was published, and attacked on all sides, as undermining the very foundations of Christianity, did its author say a word to make it plain that he admits a supernatural Revelation?

Even if it were clear that he does admit Revelation and believes that our dogmas are from God by their origin, what does he mean by their *substance*, which is divine, as opposed to their *structure* and *composition*, which are human? Let us examine this as exemplified in the fundamental dogma of Christianity, the Incarnation. What, according to Loisy, is the *substance*, and what is the *structure* of that dogma? What is from Christ and what is from man? "The divinity of Christ, the Incarnation of the Word, was the only conceivable way of translating to Greek intelligence the idea of the Messiah" (p. 193). "From an historical point of view, it may be maintained that the Trinity and the Incarnation are Greek dogmas, since they are unknown to Judaism and Judaic Christianity" (p. 195). For the early Christians, Christ was simply the Messiah, Christianity was "A Jewish movement founded on the idea of the reign of the Messiah" (p. 188). What is meant in Loisy's book by the Messiah and the reign of the Messiah? The answer is found in Section II on "The Kingdom of Heaven," and in Section III on "The Son of God." That title is the equivalent of Messiah, i. e. of Vicar of God, for the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. This, then, is the *substance* of our dogma of the Incarnation: Christ the Representative of God for the establish-

[4] *Autour d'un Petit Livre*, p. 195.

ment of the Kingdom, i. e. something entirely different from what has always been understood by Christ's Divinity.

Is not Loisy's mind well summed up, then, in the twenty-second proposition of the Syllabus, viz. "The dogmas which the Church gives out as revealed are not truths which have fallen down from heaven, but are an interpretation of religious facts, which the human mind has acquired by laborious effort"? What is the value of that *interpretation*? Do we find in it sufficient ground for belief in Christ's Divinity? So well did Loisy at first conceal his extreme views on this point that not a few of his readers were deceived. He said clearly enough that for the historian Christ is not God, but he said also that for faith Christ is God.[5] His ablest critic, Dr. Lepin, thought that, while doing away with the traditional proofs of Christ's Divinity, Loisy fully believed this dogma on the authority of the Church.[6] It is now evident that the expression, "Christ is God for faith," or for the believer, had no such meaning. In a recent interview with a reporter of *Le Matin* (Paris), Loisy was quoted as openly denying the Divinity of Christ and His Resurrection. Baron von Hügel made praiseworthy efforts to elicit from him a disavowal. But Loisy, instead of denying that the interview took place, or at least of clearly professing his faith in Christ's Divinity and Resurrection, merely declared that his distinction between the point of view of faith and that of science is essential and real, and that he does not guarantee the remarks attributed to him in the newspapers. For the exact and complete expression of his thought, he refers to his books, especially to his work on the Synoptics and to his *Simples Réflexions*. From a criticism of the former work, which appeared in the last number of this REVIEW, it is evident that Loisy holds the opinions attributed to him in *Le Matin*. The same opinions are even more clearly expressed in his criticism of the Syllabus and Encyclical. As the book is under the ban of the Church, it should be read only from a sense of duty and with

[5] *Autour d'un Petit Livre*, p. 155.

[6] Jésus Messie . . . 2nd ed., C. 4, § 4, p. 262.

proper authorization. If a vindication of the Holy Father's condemnation of Modernism was necessary, we may say that no stronger can be found. The writer admits that his writings have supplied the greater number of propositions condemned in the Syllabus (p. 6); that he more than any other Catholic writer has supplied the materials which the theologians of His Holiness have elaborated into a system (p. 15). He goes further still when he writes of the Encyclical: "It imposes upon Catholic belief no new proposition. It is but the complete and necessarily logical expression of the teaching received in the Church since the end of the thirteenth century" (p. 23). "Pius X only drew the conclusions which logically follow from the official teaching of the Church . . . Leo XIII would not have made the Encyclical perceptibly different, at least in its essentials and in the *theoretical* (dogmatic) part" (p. 275). The Pope, however, was wrong, Loisy contends, in taking for granted a principle contested by several Modernists, i. e. "that there is an immutable deposit of revealed truth of which he is the only and infallible guardian . . . The idea of setting a term to Divine Revelation is entirely mechanical and artificial" (pp. 139, 58).

Now it has always been the belief of the Catholic Church that there is a deposit containing revealed truth handed down from the Apostles through Scripture and Tradition. It is also the belief of the Church, defined by the Councils of Trent and the Vatican, that the Holy Scripture is the Word of God, that the inspired writings have God for their Author. For Loisy "God is Author of the Bible, as He is the Architect of Notre Dame of Paris or of St. Peter's at Rome" (p. 42). "In the Gospels, even in the Synoptics, we have only a weak echo of the teaching of Jesus" (p. 50). "The narratives of the birth of Jesus in Matthew and Luke are rightly considered by critics as entirely fictitious" (p. 61). Of the Resurrection Loisy writes: "The testimony of faith does not prove, any more than the testimony of history, the material fact commonly understood by resurrection" (p. 80). "What is historically false can never be true, under the same respect, and,

as a matter of fact, for faith. No Modernist has maintained the absurd conclusion that, while according to history, Jesus wrought no miracles, and made no prophecies, the reverse is true for faith; that for history He never rose from the dead, while for faith He is risen . . . No Modernist has maintained that the Resurrection is historically false, but only that it was not and could not be proved. Even if the material reality of the Resurrection had been explicity denied—and to consider it as historically non-existing was to deny it—what may have been written about the life of Christ in faith, and for faith, is not an affirmation of what history has contested. It is question of immortality in whatever sense, not of Resurrection in the proper sense of the word" (p. 169-170).

With regard to the Church and the Sacraments here are Loisy's views: Christ looking forward to His speedy return, unconscious of being anything but the Vicar of God for the establishment of the Kingdom, could not even think of establishing a Church or of instituting the Sacraments. "If Jesus Christ had wished to found a religion distinct from Judaism, He would not have failed to determine its organization and worship . . . Until His last day Christ only announced the near coming of the Kingdom of God, i. e. the fulfilment of the promises made to Israel by the Older Prophets. We should not therefore be surprised, if He instituted neither Church nor worship distinct from the Mosaic religion . . . Jesus had no idea or intention concerning the Sacraments of the Church" (pp. 180; 184). "Neither the words, 'This is My Body,' nor the words, 'This is My Blood,' belong to the primitive tradition concerning the Last Supper. Jesus gave only bread and wine to His disciples telling them He would no more eat or drink with them except in the festival of the Kingdom of Heaven" (p. 90). "The early Church had elders and overseers who became priests and bishops; she did not know the sacred functionary, the Pontiff; this again is a fact" (p. 95). Here is Loisy's account of the origin of the Eucharist and of the Priesthood: "As the Christian Supper took the

character of a liturgical act, those who ordinarily presided over it acquired the sacerdotal character." [7]

We might ask, when did such a tremendous change take place? How could the Apostles and the early Christians so completely misunderstand their Master as to ascribe to Him an institution of which He never thought? How could St. Paul, a quarter of a century after Christ's death, in a letter whose authenticity has not been and cannot be seriously questioned, speak of the Eucharist as of a well-known Christian rite received from Christ Himself? In Loisy's theory these are insuperable difficulties.

It is not the purpose of this paper, however, to refute these views, but to show their opposition to Catholic doctrine. Now if Christ never thought of instituting the Eucharist and the Priesthood, if for the early Christians the Eucharist was only a common repast, if those who presided over it had no priestly character and no priestly powers, there can be no ground for our belief in the Real Presence, in the Sacrifice of the Mass, and in the priesthood.

It is clear that a choice has to be made between those theories and historical Catholicism. How then could Tyrrell write recently in the *Hibbert Journal* (January, 1908) that "The faith of Pius X and of Abbé Loisy is one and the same"? It is the same in the sense that they both use the same word, but to express two entirely different notions. Their faith is the same, if the faith of St. Athanasius was that of Arius; if the faith of the Council of Trent was that of Luther; if the faith of Cardinal Manning was the faith of Matthew Arnold or of Rénan.

We can trace the same evolution of thought and expression, and we can find the same destructive theories, in the utterances of Tyrrell. In his latest writings, his views are no doubt expressed clearly enough to make every one see their opposition to Catholic Faith; but in several previous works they were implied or expressed so obscurely as not to be perceived by many. In Catholic magazines *Lex Orandi* (1903) generally

[7] *Autour d'un Petit Livre*, p. 252.

received a favorable review, although the Abbé Franon, of the Catholic University of Toulouse, detected in it, and pointed out, the fundamental errors now condemned in the Encyclical, i. e. dogmatic definitions are the product of the mind working on the data of the religious sense. They have a twofold value: the one intellectual, the other religious or practical; the former relative and variable, the other absolute and immutable. The test, or criterion, of religious truth is experience: the dogmas of the Church are true, in the measure in which they help us to develop our religious life. Hence Catholicism has nothing to fear from historical criticism; for facts of history, such as Christ's Resurrection, or His Virgin Birth, do not belong to faith as facts, but only in their spiritual meaning for us, in the lesson which they contain.[8]

That this interpretation of *Lex Orandi* was correct would not probably be denied by Tyrrell himself; but it was far from evident to most readers of the book. For several years after its publication, its author remained a contributor to more than one of our Catholic periodicals. He professed to "take the Church and Her saints as his guides in faith and morals," but in a sense which only few could then suspect. The illusion of his admirers came to an end by the publication of *A Much-Abused Letter*, in 1906, and of *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, in 1907. The *Letter* had originally been written to a Catholic Professor of Anthropology, who, being unable to see the force of the arguments for Catholicism and to accept as true the dogmas as taught by the Church, seriously thought of giving up his religion. Tyrrell advised him to remain in the Church and to receive the Sacraments, on the ground that faith does not stand for theological orthodoxy, for assent to a dogmatic system (p. 39); it does not mean "mental assent to a system of conceptions of the understanding" (p. 51); it is "not a sharing in the common creed of the Visible Church, but in the common visions of the Invisible Church" (p. 81). A distinction must be made between the collective consciousness of the people of God and the con-

[8] Cf. *Bulletin de Littérature Ecclesiastique*, 1903, pp. 157 ff.

sciously formulated mind and will of the governing section of the Church. "A man may have great faith and yet consider the Church's consciously formulated ideas and intentions about Herself as more or less untrue to Her deepest nature" (pp. 55 and 56). In those formulated ideas "the spirit of the whole body of the faithful strives to arrive at some degree of self-consciousness . . . When authority [of Popes, Bishops, Councils, Theologians] is dumb or stultifies itself, private conviction resumes its previous rights and liberties" (p. 57). Hence, although "formulated Catholicism does violence to your intelligence and your moral sense" (p. 60), it would be a mistake to leave the Church. "The Roman communion may be no more than the charred stump of a tree torn to pieces by gales and rent by thunderbolts; she may be, and probably is, more responsible for all the schisms than the schismatics themselves; yet, unlike them all, she stands for the principle of Catholicity" (p. 77). Catholicism remains "the highest expression, or determination, and the most effectual instrument, of the life of religion" (p. 75). "Doubtless, as an expression, it is full of distortions, excesses, defects; its truth lies inextricably mixed with error as gold in the ore; yet the ore may be richer than any yet given to man; and pure gold may be unattainable as long as man is man" (p. 79).

A man therefore may and should remain a Catholic, no matter what his convictions may be on such subjects as Christ, the Eucharist, and Penance. "Putting aside all theological problems, you will still allow that for you the Crucifix represents the highest ideal of life; that Jesus stands for the most perfect type of humanity *in individuo* . . . Dogma apart, and taken at its lowest, the Eucharist remains for you the Sacrament of communion and incorporation with that mystical Christ-Crucified; an act by which you offer yourself to be received into that divine company or spiritual organism . . . And if ever your conscience is seriously troubled and you feel that you have cut yourself off from the spiritual unity of this mystical Christ, there is no reason why you should not still see in the Sacrament of Penance a means of reconcilia-

tion" (pp. 83-85). In other words, Tyrrell advised his friend to go to Communion although he did not believe in the Real Presence, and to seek absolution from a priest, without believing in the priesthood.

We should not indeed forget that this letter was an argument *ad hominem*, to meet an extreme case; however, like other publications from the same author, for which no *imprimatur* could be obtained, it was printed for private circulation. In giving it to the public, Tyrrell frankly admitted that some passages can hardly be defended on Catholic principles. But then it is hard to see how such destructive theories could be assumed by a believer even for the sake of argument. The notes which accompany the published letter do not contain a clear repudiation of those views, which on the contrary have been re-iterated in a later work, *Through Scylla and Charybdis* (1907), as the expression of the author's mature judgment. Here also he substitutes for the Christian idea of Revelation and Faith something entirely different from them.

Revelation is "the self-manifestation of the divine in our inward life" (p. 205.) "The word is used primarily to denote an experience, and derivatively to denote the record or expression by which that experience is restated and communicated to others" (p. 268). It is "a perennial phenomenon which obtains in every soul that is religiously alive and active. As the Spirit did not cease with the Apostles, so neither did Revelation and prophecy" (p. 292). In the Bible and in the authentic teachings of the Church, we have, so to say, the utterance of a collective and continuous experience. However, this collective experience is like gold in the ore, inextricably mixed up with mere theological speculation or history (p. 307).

This true view of Catholicism "has always been represented by a feeble and oppressed minority, and branded with the disapprobation of the reigning average;" still those few are more loyal than the average to the spirit of Christ. They know the mind of the Church better than Her official interpreters. They accept Her teaching in the measure in which

it is in accordance with the still higher and highest canon of Catholic truth with the mind of Christ. The ultimate criterion of truth, therefore, is not the authority of the Church, but private judgment. A man may reject all the dogmas of the Church, in the sense in which the Church imposes them on our faith, and still claim to be a Catholic.

Tyrrell himself must feel that his theories are incompatible with historical Catholicism; for in his criticism of the Encyclical, in the London *Times* and the *Hibbert Journal*, he wrote: "No Modernist has any right whatever to be surprised at this Encyclical . . . Any concessions a more liberal Pope might make to Modernist requirements could only be concessions of diplomacy . . . contrary to the true spirit and logic of the system." Nevertheless he defines Modernism as "an attempt to reconcile the essentials of Catholic Faith with those indisputable results of historical criticism . . . ending with a clear intuition of the perfect concord between faith and reason, between the unchanging facts and experiences of the supernatural life and the ever-changing and growing expression of those facts in doctrines and institutions" (pp. 249-250).

Like the leader of Modernism in England, Italian Modernists offer their program as "vital and as the only means of salvation for the Church" (p. 12). Professor Briggs refers to the excommunication against the unknown authors of *Il Programma dei Modernisti* as "an instance in which the elementary principles of justice have been thoroughly disregarded." As a matter of fact, for any one who compares that criticism of the Encyclical with the essential conditions of membership in the Catholic Church, the decree of the Pope simply declared that the authors of the *Programma*, having ceased to fulfil those conditions, had no longer a right to call themselves Catholics, or, in other words, were excommunicated. What is their idea of Revelation and Faith, of the Gospels and of Christ? "Religious knowledge is the actual experience of the divine working in us and in all things" (p. 114). "The whole of Catholic dogma was born from the need of harmonizing the experience of faith with the mental conditions of the

time, the immutable religious spirit with the expression of ever-changing thought" (p. 106). Hence the necessity of changing the old notion of Revelation, "not substantially, since it remains God's message to man, but regarding the manner of transmission of that message" (pp. 26, 48).

Any Catholic who accepts the traditional definition of Revelation will be unable to see how the proposed substitute for it, i. e. "God's action in us and in all things," is not something "substantially different."

For the authors of the *Programma*, the definitions of the Vatican Council, and of course of other councils, are "doctrinal formulas defined at a given moment, in answer to the needs of the collective religious sentiment," i. e. to express the religious sentiment of the Christian community (p. 126). Miracles and prophecies cannot be considered as credentials of Christianity, for they "are still more shocking than surprising to modern conscience, and they elude the control of experience . . . These pretended foundations of faith have seemed to us irreparably frail" (p. 116). Regarding Christ, Italian Modernists first give it as an undoubted fact that the Gospels cannot be considered by the historian as a faithful account of His life and teaching. "In the New Testament, as in the Old, we do not possess historical works in the true sense of the word, but Sacred Histories determined in great part by faith, for the service of which they were written." The differences between the Synoptics must be accounted for, exclusively, by the religious tendencies of each writer (p. 73); in other words, the Evangelists, each according to his peculiar religious experience or the needs of his readers, freely ascribe to Christ miracles which He never wrought, and words which He never spoke. One thing, however, is beyond doubt, i. e. Christ preached nothing but the coming of the Kingdom; this is self-evident, and needs no proof, although Christ's teaching on the subject occupies but a small place in the Gospels, and is considered by Harnack as secondary and unimportant. For the authors of the *Programma*, this is the substance of Jesus' teaching; "the rest represents the expression of new ideas to

which Christian experience gave rise . . . It is impossible to find in the historical teaching of Christ, even in an embryonic state, the theological teaching of the Church" (p. 71). What about the Divinity of Christ? Here, as in Loisy's writings, it is supposed to have come into existence by a translation of the Jewish idea of the Messiah into the Greek concept of the Logos, while keeping its moral and religious value, which is the substance, the permanent element, of the doctrine, the Christ of Faith (p. 99). The authors of the *Programma* repudiate the accusation of transfiguration and deformation in a way which would seem to make their system innocuous; apparently they do not apply it to the ontological order, but only to the order of our knowledge. Does it mean that Christ is God, only that men did not know it? Does it mean that the transfiguration which took place simply made the truth manifest? Here is the answer: "We do not pretend that from the ontological point of view, there were not, in the historical Christ, those ethical values and those religious meanings which Christian experience slowly discovered in living the Gospel's message" (pp. 137, 138). In other words, history sees in Christ only a man; He was not conscious of being God; the early Christians did not suspect it; He is not really God; but "the religious or ethical value" of that concept, the only thing which we have to believe, was first contained in the Jewish conception of the Messiah, then in the Greek idea of the Word Incarnate, and may, later on, be expressed in other ways, having the same ethical and religious value.

That such theories are incompatible with Christianity was recognized by a non-Catholic writer in the *Contemporary Review* of last November. "Some of the errors which the Pope denounces are errors which strike at the very root of Christianity. If, for example, we can have but little knowledge of the historical Christ, and are constrained to think of Him as a Man who lived and died like other men, without consciousness of His unique authority and atoning death, it is surely impossible to see any ground for belief in His Deity at all. By what right did the Church quit the simple teaching

of its Master and invent an ideal of its own?" These words show well the destructive character of Modernism; still it is claimed that it has a constructive side, and in the February number of the *Nineteenth Century* "a Catholic Layman," Henry C. Corrance, attempts to set it forth in a rejoinder to Canon Moyes's article in the December number of the same periodical. Modernism, according to Mr. Corrance, is "an attempt to reconcile the Catholic Faith with criticism and the scientific method." Unfortunately, here again the faith which is thus to be reconciled with criticism and the scientific method is something entirely different from the Catholic Faith. Every careful reader will easily perceive this and see in the article a vindication, not of Modernism, but of the Encyclical which condemned it. The Catholic Faith is based on certain miraculous facts which are the credentials of Divine Revelation. To the writer of the article it is clear that "from the historical standpoint, so far from miracles being made to prove anything to those who are living hundreds of years after they are alleged to have happened, it is they that stand in need of proof, and that, as regards prophecies, it is at least as probable that the events were adapted to them by the writers through the unrecognized influence of those events upon their minds, as that they should actually have prefigured the events" (p. 312). Criticism is bound "in every case to assign phenomenal and not mystical causes to phenomenal events" (p. 313). This excludes not only the proving force, but also the very existence, of miracles and prophecies.

Among the miracles which have been alleged as a proof of the divine origin of Christian Revelation, Christ's Resurrection has always been considered as the most important. A few years after the death of our Lord, St. Paul wrote: "If Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." [9] According to the writer of the article in question, our faith would always contain an element of uncertainty if it depended on the historical fact of Christ's Resurrection, because this fact, like any other historical fact, may be dis-

[9] I Cor., 15: 14.

proved (pp. 314-315). Hence faith is without rational foundation: "faith necessarily precedes thought and is the foundation on which it rests . . . Faith comes first, then its proof, and that proof is experience" (pp. 318, 319). With such an idea of faith, it is easy to see what will become of the notion of Revelation: "the old idea of a Revelation, which is given externally to the Church, and which the Church has only to receive and hand on [is one which] it is impossible to reconcile with the history of dogma" (p. 315).

To admit that Revelation "is addressed directly to man's abstract reason or understanding, that it gives him certain definite information about divine things, which he is bound to believe in the same manner as he might believe the words of a witness to some terrestrial phenomena he had not seen," is to admit a theory which breaks down utterly (pp. 324-325). Still, this so-called *theory* is the infallible doctrine of the Vatican Council, and of the Catholic Church from the beginning. To say that "dogma was primarily and in its essence the outgrowth of the mystico-moral sense" (p. 325), that it is "a revelation not to the abstract reason, but to what may be called the divine consciousness in man" (p. 324); to recognize only a difference of degree between what comes from Christ and the Apostles and what comes "through the medium of the Church in the course of years, and through the ordinary channels of Christian experience and consciousness" (p. 322), is to reject the Catholic idea of faith. To call arbitrary the distinction made between the continuous action of the Holy Spirit throughout time and the inspiration of the Sacred Writers (p. 316), is a denial of the dogma of Biblical inspiration, defined by the Councils of Trent and of the Vatican.

No less opposed to Catholic teaching is the notion that the object of our faith is the *ideal*, as opposed to the *real* or *historical*. To the objection that certain historical data are included in the Christian Creed and form an integral part of it, the writer answers: "These facts are not objects of faith *qua* facts of history, but in respect of their religious significance for us, that is, in their ideal aspect and value, by which they were

elevated into the sphere of the supersensuous" (p. 314). Faith must be excluded by criticism "from the region of phenomena where, under the form of religious and mystical imagination, it once ran riot and . . . be restricted to its proper sphere, the supersensuous, the ideal, and the absolute" (p. 319).

If this theory be applied to the miraculous conception of Christ or to His Resurrection, these are not the objects of our faith as facts, but in their religious significance, or the moral lesson which they convey.

Let the reader judge for himself, and see whether the errors condemned in the Encyclical are as a system "devised in scholastic brains," or the real teaching of Modernists, who have fallen under the ban of the Church. The wonder is that men holding such theories should call themselves Catholics or even Christians, since their view of faith, of the Church, and of Christianity, is so utterly opposed to that which has obtained from the beginning. No one has a right to remain in a society who does not fulfil the essential conditions of membership, as laid down in its constitution, and interpreted by its official representatives. Modernists, whose views have been condemned, lack the most essential condition of membership in the Catholic Church, i. e. faith in the sense in which faith has always been required.

For the Catholic and for the Christian, faith consists in accepting certain things as true, on the testimony of God; it requires Revelation and its credentials, especially miracles and prophecies. But for the Modernists, Revelation is not the communication of truth by God to man; it is merely the working of the divine in us and in all things. The dogmas proposed as revealed truths are the product of the human mind, interpreting the religious experiences of the individual and of humanity; miracles and prophecies can prove nothing; for the historian, they are non-existent.

For the Christian, Christ is God; He was miraculously conceived and rose from the dead. For the Modernist, His miraculous conception is a myth; His Divinity is the creation

of the early Christians; His Resurrection means simply that His influence will ever be felt in the world.

For the Catholic, the Church and the Sacraments come from Christ Himself. For the Modernist, Christ never thought of establishing a Church or instituting any rites. These were called into existence by the needs of the early Christian community.

For the Catholic, the definitions of the Church are immutable, because they infallibly teach what God has revealed. For the Modernist, those definitions are only the expression of the religious experience of the Christian society at a given moment, and they must vary with new experiences and new mental conditions.

If one thing is certain, it is that a choice has to be made between these two concepts of the Catholic Faith. The issue is not "Modernism *versus* Scholasticism," but "Modernism *versus* Catholicism, Christianity and all Supernatural Religion." Even Loisy himself admits as much when he says: "The Pontiff spoke the truth, when he declared that he could not remain silent without betraying the deposit of traditional doctrine." [10]

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THE CONFESSION OF CONVERTS WHO ARE BAPTIZED CONDITIONALLY.

Qu. The baptism of Congregationalists is generally presumed to be invalid. Yet in a particular case, unless this baptism is proved to be either certainly valid or certainly invalid, it remains doubtful; and in this case a convert from Congregationalism will receive only conditional baptism. Now the question arises, can such a convert, after this conditional baptism, be excused from the confession of sins committed before his conversion, on the plea that there is here only a conditional, i. e. doubtful obligation to confess; and that *lex dubia non obligat*. I maintain that the principle seems to be inapplicable in this case, as, according to

[10] Remarques, p. 276.

the Roman ruling given for Anglican converts, the convert, having confessed his sins, must receive conditional absolution. Am I right or wrong?

It cannot be said that ecclesiastical law admits any legitimate doubt about the obligation of converts in the United States to make a confession of their past lives, when they seemed, after sufficiently careful investigation, to require conditional baptism. The chief warrant for this obligation, at least since 20 July, 1859, has been the Instruction of the S. Congregation addressed to the then Bishop of Philadelphia, and incorporated in the Acts of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore (Tit. V, Cap. II, n. 240). It stated: "Si Baptismus sit sub conditione iterandus, hoc ordine procedendum erit: (a) Abjuratio seu Fidei Professio, (b) Baptismus conditionatus, (c) Confessio sacramentalis cum Absolutione conditionata."

That this Instruction was understood to be obligatory so far as it regulated the action of those who were subject to the discipline prescribed by the Council, will be seen later on.

In 1868 a question similar to that proposed by the Bishop of Philadelphia was addressed to the Holy See by the English Bishops. The S. Office replied, 17 December, 1868, that in the case of converts from Anglicanism who were baptized conditionally, the confession was to be required, and conditional absolution to be given. The act was incorporated in the Decrees of the First Synod of Westminster. The S. Congregation in giving this decision referred to a previous declaration to the same effect made in the case of converts from Lutheranism in Germany, specifically that of a certain Carl Wipperman (17 July, 1715), viz. "ejus praeteritae vitae peccata confiteatur, et ab iis sub conditione absolvatur."

Nevertheless, in view of the fact that these decisions referred to distinctly specified localities, the question of their furnishing a norm of obligatory action for converts similarly conditioned in other countries appeared still to be an open one. Accordingly Ballerini, followed by others, argued against this

obligation.[1] So did D'Annibale and Bucceroni, who applied the principle "in dubio libertas," which seemed to favor not only those for whom there existed no special legislation, but might be extended with discretion even where the local law operated, provided there were reasons that would make the requirement of a full confession a particular gravamen for the individual.

It appears, however, that some time after the Westminster synodal enactment a *Dubium* was proposed to Rome soliciting a universal application of the Decrees thus far issued for individual localities. Such a decision was issued by the S. Congregation of Propaganda in 1869 (12 July). Apparently through an oversight the Decree was omitted from the official *Collectanea S. Congreg. de Prop. Fide* published in 1893, and thence the conclusion was drawn by recent theological writers, like Genicot, that it was spurious, which led to the strengthening of the conviction advocated by Ballerini and others, that the obligation was merely intended for certain cases in which confession might prove beneficial; but that it was by no means universal, nor was it the intention of the Church to apply it under all conditions.

But in the latest edition of the *Collectanea* the error is corrected by a foot-note which makes it quite plain that sacramental confession is to be required in every case where conditional Baptism is administered. We print here the full text of the Decision, which is in the form of a response to a letter addressed by the Archbishop of Quebec to the Holy Father. The answer comes from Cardinal Barnabo who interprets the mind of the S. Congregation to the effect that the Instruction of 1868, although ostensibly given to the Bishops of England, was indicative of a universal law to be considered binding, not only in England but also in other countries; and he adds the significant phrase: "*Hinc* patet quod ***nullatenus permitti possit ut*** praedictae decisioni ***contraria sententia doceatur.***" There can be no misunderstanding of the meaning of

[1] Cf. *Opus Morale Magnum*, Tract. V, sect. I, n. 150 sq.—Tract. X, sect. II, n. 78.—Tract X, sect. V, n. 28. Edit. 1892.

this explanation, which disposes of the discussion among theologians as to what is permissible in the case.

The Archbishop of Quebec referring to the decision given to the English Bishops, had requested the Holy Father to declare whether the same answer was to be given to the question when it was formulated about localities other than those within the jurisdiction of those prelates:

An debeat juxta Synodi provincialis Angliae decretum a Sancta Sede approbatum, confessio sacramentalis a neo-conversis in Anglia exigi, et an ea debeat esse integra?

S. Congregatio S. R. U. Inquisitionis, decreto suo, die 17 Dec. 1868 dato, et a Sanctitate Vestra eadem die ac feria approbato et confirmato, respondit: Affirmative; et dandum esse decretum latum sub feria quinta, die decima septima Junii anni 1715 quoad dubium:

"An quidam Carolus Wipperman, S. Fidei Catholicae reconciliatus, sit rebaptizandus; et quatenus affirmative, an teneatur confiteri omnia peccata praeteritae vitae; et quatenus affirmative, an confessio praeponenda sit, vel postponenda baptismo conferendo sub conditione?

"Sanctissimus, auditis votis Emorum, dixit: Carolum Ferdinandum (Wipperman) esse rebaptizandum sub conditione, et, collato baptismo, ejus praeteritae vitae peccata confiteatur, et ab eis sub conditione absolvatur."

Nunc autem humiliter quaero an decretum supra allegatum obliget non tantum in Anglia, pro qua latum est, sed etiam in hac provincia ecclesiastica et in aliis regionibus?

Quebeci die 29 maii 1869.

✠ C. F. Archiepiscopus Quebecensis.

To the above the following answer was sent:

Quoad dubium ab A. T. litteris diei 29 elapsi mensis maii propositum, atque sacramentalem confessionem attingens a neo-conversis exigendam, observandum occurrit responsum S. O. Feriae v, loco iv, diei 17 decembris elapsi anni, licet Episcopis Angliae tantummodo rogantibus datum, universalem legem continere, proindeque non solum in Anglia, sed in aliis etiam regionibus obligare. Hinc patet quod nullatenus permitti possit ut praedictae

decisioni contraria sententia doceatur. Romae, ex aedibus S. C. P. F. die 10 Julii 1869.

AL. C. BARNABO, *Prefectus.*
JOANNES SIMEONI, *Secretarius.*

The decision is therefore, as the Cardinal expresses it, based upon a law which has universal application and is not merely a disciplinary enactment that might vary according to the circumstances of locality. It may be asked, however, why the law should in this case be so regarded as to exclude the application of the principle of liberty in doubtful cases, which is commonly recognized by the disciplinary legislation of the Church; for, according to the reasoning of La Croix[3] and others whom Ballerini cites, as above stated, conditional Baptism implies a doubt about the validity of the previous Baptism, and hence the obligation of confessing the sins, committed after the same, remains likewise doubtful. Moreover, the principle that "peccata dubia haud sunt materia necessaria sacramenti Poenitentiae" is one generally accepted by theologians, whence it is inferred that the obligation of confessing, in the case, remains doubtful and therefore may not be forced upon a convert who is conditionally baptized.

Against this reasoning it may be argued that the very fact of conditional baptism implies the possibility of a previous valid baptism which, though it cannot be actually established, can not on the other hand be actually disproved. But if it should have been valid, which is no less probable than the contrary, then the obligation, on the part of the convert as a member of the Church, existed for him, to confess his sins. This obligation has never ceased and does not cease, so long as it is not certain that the first baptism was actually invalid, and there is no other sacramental channel for remitting the guilt. Among the reasons which the English Bishops gave for presenting the doubt above referred to was the following: The convert (conditionally baptized) is in duty bound to use

[2] See *Analecta Ecclesiastica*, Dec. 1899, p. 489.

[3] L. VI, p. I, n. 324.

every precaution to free his soul from the stain of any grave sin which he may have contracted, and from which no one baptized in infancy may be presumed to be wholly free; all the more since the obligation of making a general confession of his past life is not to be urged later on, so long as the principle of "lex dubia non obligat" is maintained. This touches the crucial point. If these sins are not washed away by the conditional baptism (and on the assumption of a previous valid baptism, which is not excluded, the soul would not be so cleansed of its actual sins), there would be no sure means of absolution from them except through the Sacrament of Penance in which they should have to be confessed. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the presumption in the case of those who are conditionally baptized is, according to a general principle of ecclesiastical legislation, rather in favor of the validity than against it. For, unless the evidence is plainly for invalidity, baptism is administered conditionally. "Generatim loquendo *ut christiani habendi sunt ii*, de quibus dubitatur an valide baptizati fuerint.—Censendum est validum Baptismum in ordine ad validitatem matrimonii." (S. O. 9 Sept. 1868). The doubt as to the obligation of confessing in the case of conditional baptism is at most a negative doubt, and here again we have the rule applied in the administration of the Sacrament of Penance, to wit: "Dubium mere negativum non destruit obligationem ex alio capite moraliter certam tale peccatum clavibus subjiciendi." This refers of course to "peccata certe commissa et non certe condonata." An argument of analogy might be also drawn from a decision of the S. Congr. of the Council in the case of doubts touching the existence of impediments to the validity of the Sacrament of Matrimony. "Quando probationes non sunt undequaque concludentes, ita ut dubitari possit de existentia impedimenti; et decernunt an hujusmodi rationes sint attendendae vel rejiciendae, an rationabiles necne sint: Si rationabiles revera sint, tunc saltem dubium de existentia impedimenti rationabile evadit; sed hoc in casu *nequit invocari principium 'Lex dubia non obligat,' quia si revera impedimentum subsistat, per*

illud principium non cessat; et aliunde Ecclesia in sacramentis administrandis tutiorem partem sequi tenetur." (Decr. 14 Jun. 1884).

Regarded from the viewpoint of expediency, there remain further reasons why confession should be required in general from converts who are conditionally baptized. They are also considered in the document submitted to the Holy See by the English Bishops in making their request for a decision to the effect that the obligation be clearly defined. As a rule, they write, it will be found difficult to engage the intellect of converts to a complete acceptance of the mysteries of our holy faith, unless they are moved thereto by the self-humiliation and submission which, through divine ordinance, is attached to the obligation imposed by Sacramental Confession. Moreover, without a full Confession it is ordinarily impossible to ascertain whether the convert is actually in the proper disposition to receive Baptism, since there may be question of obligation to restitution, of avoiding proximate occasions of sin, of abandoning invalid ties contracted under plea of marriage; also how far dispensation in such cases and others may be necessary to restore the candidate to a proper fellowship in the true Church of Christ.

All this points to the reasonableness and beneficial effect of the law. About its obligation there can be no longer any doubt. It binds every convert who is conditionally baptized, not however without those limitations which counsel the confessor to use his discretion as in case of any other penitent bound by the law to submit his sins to the jurisdiction of the Keys.

A LESSON FROM NEWMAN.

TO anyone, however moderately well acquainted with Newman's works, nothing in the utterances of the Modernists can have been more amazing than that they should have dared an endeavor, as some of them have, to shelter their doctrines under the shadow of his great name. The root principle of their system, depicted in the Encyclical *Pascendi*,

as observed by a writer in the *Dublin Review*, is subjectivism in religion—the identification of religion with sentiment or emotion rather than with belief in objective truth, issuing in the conception of a deity immanent in man and not transcendent, and of dogmatic formulas as no longer the expression of facts—of the dogmatic truths of revelation—but as the mind's reflection on its subjective religious experience. Whereas Newman, in most clear and complete opposition to such a system, emphatically declares:[1] "From the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion: I know no other religion; I cannot enter into the idea of any other sort of religion; religion, as a mere sentiment, is to me a dream and a mockery. As well can there be filial love without the fact of a father, as devotion without the fact of a Supreme Being."

Reason, even apart from Revelation, teaches us that God exists. St. Paul argues this from a consideration of the visible world, which in its mechanism bears plain marks of having been designed, created, set in order and constantly preserved by an Almighty Intelligence, Power and Wisdom, clearly external to the universe itself; and, because self-existent, therefore eternal.

Conscience, likewise, apart from Revelation, convinces us of the existence of a living, intelligent, omniscient and omnipresent Being toward whom it is directed; since none but such a Rewarder of virtue and Avenger of vice could excite the feelings which a man experiences in the innermost recesses of his conscience, at whatever time and wherever he may be, strive as he will to fly from or stifle such experience. "Half the world would be puzzled to know what was meant by the moral sense," writes Newman,[2] as though correcting the Modernists' view; "but every one knows what is meant by a good or bad conscience."

Starting then with the Being of a God—since I feel it im-

[1] *Apologia*, p. 49.

[2] *Grammar of Assent*, p. 106.

possible to believe in my own existence (and of that I am quite sure) without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as a Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience—I look out of myself into the world of men, and there I see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress. And I argue about it;—*if* there be a God,—*since* there is a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity. It is out of joint with the purposes of its Creator. This is a fact, a fact as true as the fact of its existence, and thus the doctrine of what is theologically called original sin becomes to me almost as certain as that the world exists, and as the existence of God.

And now supposing it were the blessed and loving will of the Creator to interfere in this anarchical condition of things? What must be the face-to-face antagonist, by which to withstand and baffle the fierce energy of passion and the all-corroding, all-dissolving scepticism of the intellect in religious inquiries? where the concrete representation of things invisible, with the force and toughness necessary to be a breakwater against the deluge? Supposing it to be the Will of the Creator to interfere in human affairs, and to make provision for retaining in the world a knowledge of Himself, so definite and distinct as to be proof against the energy of human scepticism, in such case there is nothing to surprise the mind, if He should think fit to introduce a power into the world, invested with the prerogative of infallibility in religious matters. And this is the very claim of the Catholic Church. Her infallibility is a provision, adapted by the mercy of the Creator to preserve religion in the world, and to restrain that freedom of thought, which of course in itself is one of the greatest of our natural gifts, and to rescue it from its own suicidal excesses. A power, possessed of infallibility in religious teaching, is happily adapted to be a working instrument, in the course of human affairs, for smiting hard and throwing back the immense energy of the aggressive, capricious, untrustworthy intellect.

And first she teaches that human nature must be reclaimed

from its state of rebellion against its Maker and be restored, not simply through certain outward provisions of preaching and teaching, even though they be her own, but from an inward spiritual power or grace imparted directly from above, and of which she is the channel.

She distinguishes between nature and grace, and while she recognizes in man's nature real moral excellences, though degraded, she insists upon the necessity of grace to rescue his nature from its misery, not simply by restoring it on its own level, but by lifting it up to a higher level than its own. She insists upon the necessity of man's reconsecration to his Maker, and the sanctification of his passions, affections, aims, conscience, will, and, the last not the least, his intellect.

She teaches the distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion, and that, while a man can arrive at the former by means of his reason and conscience—gifts which he possesses by nature, he cannot arrive at faith in the latter save by a gift above nature. Revelation begins where Natural Religion fails. The Religion of Nature is a mere inchoation, and needs a complement. It is based upon the sense of sin; it recognizes the disease, but it cannot find, it does not look out for the remedy.[8]

As to what the natural man can do in relation to the pursuit of Divine truth, Newman reminds us that by nature, not by grace, he has the gifts of reason and conscience, and that mere reason and conscience will lead him to discover, and in a measure pursue, objects which are, properly speaking, supernatural and divine. The natural man can feel, he can imagine, he can admire, he can reason, he can infer; he can arrive at a logical conclusion in relation to the truths of religion. But beyond this he cannot get without the aid of supernatural grace.

Reason is the way to faith; its conclusions are often the very objects of faith. It precedes faith, when souls are converted to the Catholic Church; and it is the instrument which the Church herself is guided to make use of, when she is called upon to put forth those definitions of doctrine, in which, ac-

[8] *Apologia*, chap. v. *Grammar of Assent*, Pt. II, chap. x. Cf. also, throughout, *Discourses*, viii-xi.

cording to the promise and power of her Lord and Saviour, she is infallible. But though the conclusions of reason may be the objects of faith, it does not follow that the man who has arrived at those conclusions has faith in them. There is many a man who has ground enough to believe, who wishes to believe, but who cannot believe. It is always indeed his own fault, for God gives grace to all who ask for it, and use it, but still such is the fact, that conviction is not faith. Take the parallel case of obedience—a case affecting the conscience;—many a man knows he ought to obey God, and does not and cannot,—through his own fault indeed, but still he cannot; for through grace alone can he obey. As then men may be convinced, and not act according to their conviction, so may they be convinced, and not believe according to their conviction. The arguments for religion do not compel any one to believe, just as arguments for good conduct do not compel any one to obey. We may see what is right, whether in matters of faith or obedience, of ourselves, but we cannot will what is right without the grace of God.

Not that such convictions, however, are arrived at independently of grace. *Spiritus Domini replevit orbem terrarum.* Grace is given for the merits of Christ all over the earth; there is no corner, even of Paganism, where it is not present, present in each heart of man in real sufficiency for his ultimate salvation—sufficient for a beginning, sufficient to enable him to plead for other grace, and that second such as to impetrate a third; and so on until he is within view of the promised land, into which grace will, if he continues to correspond with it, at length bring him.

And grace deals with men differently, in accordance with their circumstances, needs, and capacities. Conviction comes slowly to some men, quickly to others; in some it is the result of much thought and many reasonings; in others, of a sudden illumination. They feel the weight of their sins, and they see that that religion must come from God which alone has the means of forgiving them. Or they long for a guide amid the strife of tongues; and the very doctrine of the Church about

faith, which is so hard to many, is conviction to them. Or they hear many objections to the Church, and follow out the whole subject far and wide, and conviction can scarcely come to them except as at the end of a long inquiry.

Speaking for himself, and narrating his own personal experience, Newman in a passage of his *Apologia*[4]—which is important as correcting a certain Modernist's representation of his teaching—says: "In the first chapter of this Narrative I spoke of certitude as the consequence divinely intended and enjoined upon us, of the accumulative force of certain given reasons which, taken one by one, were only probabilities. Let it be recollected that I am historically relating my state of mind at the period of my life which I am surveying. I am not speaking theologically, nor have I any intention of going into controversy, or of defending myself; but speaking historically of what I held in 1843-4, I say, that I believed in a God on a ground of probability, that I believed in Christianity on a probability, and that I believed in Catholicism on a probability, and that these three grounds of probability, distinct from each other of course in subject-matter, were still all of them one and the same in nature of proof, as being probabilities—probabilities of a special kind, a cumulative, a transcendent probability but still probability; inasmuch as He who made us has so willed, that in mathematics indeed we should arrive at certitude by rigid demonstration, but in religious inquiry we should arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities; He has willed, I say, that we should so act, and, as willing it, He coöperates with us in our acting, and thereby enables us to do that which He wills us to do, and carries us on, if our will does but coöperate with His, to a certitude which rises higher than the logical force of our conclusions . . . But let it be observed, that I am stating a matter of fact, not defending it; and if any Catholic says in consequence that I have been converted in a wrong way, I cannot help that now." Apropos of this same Modernist's contention that Newman was opposed to the Scholastics on the ground, as he affirms, that the latter hold

[4] Page 199.

that "the reasonableness of believing can be rigorously demonstrated" and that "Newman denies it can be," it suffices to quote, again, Newman's own words from his *Grammar of Assent*:[5] "The fact of revelation is in itself demonstrably true, but it is not therefore true irresistibly; else, how comes it to be resisted? There is a vast distance between what it is in itself, and what it is to us. Light is a quality of matter, as truth is of Christianity; but light is not recognized by the blind, and there are those who do not recognize truth, from the fault, not of truth, but of themselves. I cannot convert men, when I ask for assumptions which they refuse to grant to me; and without assumptions no one can prove anything about anything. I am suspicious then of scientific demonstrations in a question of concrete fact, in a discussion between fallible men. However, let those demonstrate who have the gift; 'unusquisque in suo sensu abundet.' For me, it is more congenial to my own judgment to attempt to prove Christianity in the same informal way in which I can prove for certain that I have been born into this world, and that I shall die out of it. It is pleasant to my own feelings to follow a theological writer, such as Amort, who has dedicated to the great Pope, Benedict XIV, what he calls 'a new, modest, and easy way of demonstrating the Catholic Religion.' In this work he adopts the argument merely of the *greater* probability; I prefer to rely on that of an *accumulation* of various probabilities; but we both hold (that is, I hold with him), that from probabilities we may construct legitimate proof, sufficient for certitude. I follow him in holding, that, since a Good Providence watches over us, He blesses such means of argument as it has pleased Him to give us, in the nature of man and of the world, if we use them duly for those ends for which He has given them; and that, as in mathematics we are justified by the dictate of nature in withholding our assent from a conclusion of which we have not yet a strict logical demonstration, so by a like dictate we are not justified, in the case of concrete reasoning and especially of religious inquiry, in waiting till such logical

[5] Chap. x, § 2, Revealed Religion.

demonstration is ours, but on the contrary are bound in conscience to seek truth and to look for certainty by modes of proof, which, when reduced to the shape of formal propositions, fail to satisfy the severe requisitions of science." Later in the same chapter, after discussion of another point, Newman, so far from placing himself in opposition to the Scholastics, as our Modernist endeavors to place him, concludes: "But I submit the whole subject to the Theological School." Would that they who profess to follow him might learn, not only what he really teaches, but something also of his edifying humility and uniform submission to authority!

God, then, deals with men differently; but if they are faithful to their light, at last, in their own time, though it may be a different time to each, He brings them to that one and the same state of mind, very definite and not to be mistaken, which we call *conviction*. This is a point which should ever be kept in view: conviction is a state of mind, and it is something beyond and distinct from the mere arguments of which it is the result; it does not vary with their strength or their number. Arguments lead to a conclusion, and when the arguments are stronger, the conclusion is clearer; but conviction may be felt as strongly in consequence of a clear conclusion, as of one which is clearer.

And of what nature is this conviction as regards Revealed Religion? There is but one answer that has obtained the assent, in all ages, of men of all nations and peoples and tongues, viz., that the revelation of Divine truth vouchsafed to man is no mere philosophy thrown upon the world at large, no mere quality of mind and thought, no mere beautiful and deep sentiment or subjective opinion, but a substantive message from above, guarded and preserved in a visible polity; and that the Catholic Church, which alone of all religious politics claims infallibly, as being Divinely commissioned, to deliver that message, is God's Voice requiring man's assent to doctrine which, not humanly speaking or probably, but Divinely speaking and therefore certainly and unchangeably is true.

Thus, the development of Christian doctrine has reference,

not, as Modernists contend, to a need of its perfecting by human intelligence as though it were a philosophical system subject to continual and indefinite progress, corresponding with the progress of the human reason; but, as Newman, whom they so grossly misrepresent, most clearly and lucidly teaches in his famous book on the subject in conformity with the Vatican Council, which decrees: "The doctrine of the faith which God has revealed has not been proposed to human intelligences to be perfected by them as if it were a philosophical system, but as a divine deposit entrusted to the Spouse of Christ to be faithfully guarded and infallibly interpreted. Hence also that sense of the sacred dogmas is to be perpetually retained which our Holy Mother the Church has once declared, nor is this sense ever to be abandoned on plea or pretext of a more profound comprehension of the truth." And, as the same Council continues: "Let intelligence and science and wisdom, therefore, increase and progress abundantly and vigorously in individuals and in the mass, in the believer and in the whole Church, throughout the ages and the centuries—but only in its own kind, that is, according to the same dogma, the same sense, the same acceptation." No one can study Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* without perceiving that his, in contradistinction to that of the Modernists, is a development presupposing external revelation and proceeding from an original body of revealed truth as a *terminus a quo* by a law according to which all that was first given is preserved, and in which the latest product, to be genuine, must have existed in the original germ.[6]

Being convinced then in reason that the Catholic Church is from God, and that her doctrine therefore never can change, never can be false, the man, who has thus far been led by grace, needs a further grace to enable his will to perfect what reason leaves sufficient, indeed, but incomplete. For while the reason may be convinced, moral doubts, arising in their root from a fault of the will, may remain. Though there are

[6] Cf. Mgr. Moyes in the *Nineteenth Century*, Dec. 1907.

abundant reasons to prove to a man that the church is from God, yet he can quarrel with the conclusion; he may complain that it is not clearer, he may suspend his assent, he may doubt about it, if he will, and grace alone can turn a bad will into a good one.

This dependence of nature upon grace is the more necessary to be insisted upon in view of the fact that Modernists are so far oblivious of it as commonly to appeal for their cause in the columns of a press characterized by its hostility to the Church and ignorant of the existence of grace. The world does not know of the existence of grace. Its highest idea of man lies in the order of nature. Its teachers make the laws of this physical creation so supreme as to disbelieve the existence of miracles, as being an unseemly violation of them; and in like manner, it deifies and worships human nature and its impulses, and denies the power and the grant of grace. Like the proud spirit in the beginning, it wishes to find its supreme good in its own self, and in nothing above it; it undertakes to be sufficient for its own happiness; it has no desire for the supernatural, and therefore does not believe in it. And as nature cannot rise above nature it will not believe that the narrow way of faith and the life of grace are possible. And it is from the columns of the world's press, forsooth, that Modernists, and conspicuously those amongst them who claim membership with the Church, direct their attacks upon her dogmas and against her divinely appointed Head!

"Ye were once darkness, but now are light in the Lord," says St. Paul. The man who has coöperated with grace and entered the fold of the Church has received a gift, the gift of faith, which is no mere conviction in reason, but a firm assent, a clear certainty greater than any other certainty, wrought in the mind by the grace of God, and by it alone. "For by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Such a one is henceforth as certain that the Church and her doctrines are true, as that God is true; and he is thus certain, *because* God is true, *because* God has spoken. He realizes what St. Paul meant by the words: "He hath de-

livered us from darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love."

He realizes, as he did not before, that though the natural reason is the eyesight of the mind, it is not more than eyesight; that just as in the physical order we need, besides eyesight, a light from without to see, so is it also in relation to things spiritual. Not the keenest eyesight can see in the dark. You will as easily exercise your eyes in this sensible world without the sun, as you will be able to exercise your mind in the spiritual world without a parallel gift from without. Though your mind be the eye, the grace of God is the light. Without this light, you may be able to reason about Divine truth, but your thoughts and words will not get beyond a mere reasoning. To infer a thing is not to see it in respect to the physical world, nor is it in the spiritual. And this characteristic of reason is so clearly understood by the natural man, that, in spite of the confidence which he has in his own opinions, whatever that be, still, conscious that he has no grounds for real and fixed conviction about revealed truth, he boldly faces the difficulty and considers it a fault to be certain about revealed truth, and a merit to doubt. He holds divine truths merely as an opinion and not as a point of faith.

It is far otherwise with the Catholic believer; it is no difficult thing for him to believe; the truth is that, unless he grievously mismanages himself, the difficult thing is for him to doubt. He has received a gift which makes faith easy; it is not without an effort, a miserable effort, that any one who has received that gift, unlearns to believe. He does violence to his mind, not in exercising, but in withholding his faith.

Hence it is that the Church cannot sanction a man in reconsidering the question of her own divine mission; she holds that such inquiries, though the appointed means of entering her pale, are superseded on his entrance by the gift of a spiritual sight, a gift which consumes doubt so utterly, in any proper sense of the word, that henceforth it is not that he must not, but that he cannot entertain it; cannot entertain it except by his own great culpability; and therefore must not, because he cannot.

The Church does not allow her children to entertain any doubt of her teaching; and that, first of all, simply for this reason, because they are Catholics only while they have faith, and faith is incompatible with doubt. No one can be a Catholic without a simple faith, that what the Church declares in God's name, is God's word, and therefore true; and if it is true, it never can be false. If it is true that God became man, what is the meaning of my anticipating a time when perhaps I shall not believe that God became man? This is nothing short of anticipating a time when I shall disbelieve a truth. When, then, Protestants quarrel with us for saying that those who join us must give up all ideas of ever doubting the Church in time to come, they do nothing else but quarrel with us for insisting on the necessity of faith in her. I cannot both really believe, and yet look forward to a time when, perhaps, I shall not believe; to make provision for future doubt, is to doubt at present.

And so, when a man has become a Catholic, were he to set about following out a doubt which has occurred to him, he has already disbelieved. *I* have not to warn him against losing his faith; he is not merely in danger of losing it, he has lost it; from the nature of the case, he has already lost it; he fell from grace at the moment when he deliberately determined to pursue his doubt. It is not I who forbid him to doubt; he has taken the matter into his own hands when he determined on asking for leave; he has begun, not ended, in unbelief; his very wish, his purpose, is his sin. I do not make it so, it is such from the very state of the case. You sometimes hear, for example, of Catholics falling away, who will tell you it arose from reading the Scriptures (now-a-days they substitute the "Higher Criticism," or "Science"), which opened their eyes to the "unscripturalness" (or, ignorance of the new sciences), so they speak, of the Church of the Living God. No, Scripture (Science) did not make them disbelieve (impossible!); they disbelieved *when* they opened the Bible (or some book professing science, as the case may be); they opened it in an unbelieving spirit, and for an unbelieving purpose; they

would not have opened it had they not anticipated—I might say, hoped—that they should find things there inconsistent with Catholic teaching. They begin in self-will and disobedience, and they end in apostasy. This, then, is the direct and obvious reason why the Church cannot allow her children the liberty of doubting the truth of her word. He who really believes in it now, cannot imagine the future discovery of reasons to shake his faith; if he imagines it, he has not faith; and that so many Protestants (particularly of the "Modernist" type, albeit they imagine themselves to be Catholics still) think it a sort of tyranny in the Church to forbid any children of hers to doubt about her teaching, only shows they do not know what faith is—which is the case; it is a strange idea to them. Let a man cease to inquire, or cease to call himself her child. Inquiry precedes faith, and does not follow it. You inquired before you joined the Church; you were satisfied, and God rewarded you with the grace of faith; were you now determined to inquire further, you would lead us to think you had lost it again, for inquiry and faith are in their very nature incompatible.

Certainly, no other religious body has a right to demand such an exercise of faith in them, and a right to forbid you further inquiry, but the Catholic Church; and for this simple reason, that no other body even claims to be infallible, let alone the proof of such a claim. Here is the defect at first starting, which disqualifies them, one and all, from ever competing with the Church of God. Thus, nothing is clearer than this, that if faith in God's word is required of us for salvation, the Catholic Church is the only medium by which we can exercise it. And how can she, who has the prerogative of infallibility, allow her children to doubt of her gift? It would be a simple inconsistency in her, who is the sure oracle of truth and messenger of heaven, to look with indifference on rebels to her authority. And if you forsake her, or compel her by your rebellion to cast you out of her fold, to whom will you go? or where else find faith in its fulness, and the possibility of its true exercise?

True, many outside the fold of the Church are under the influence partly of reason and partly of faith, believe some things firmly, and have but an opinion on others. Many are in conflict with themselves, and are advancing to a crisis, after which they embrace or recede from the truth. Many are using the assistances of grace so well that they are in the way to receive its permanent indwelling in their hearts. Many, we may trust, are enjoying that permanent light, and are being securely brought forward into the Church; some, alas! may have received it, and, as not advancing toward the Holy House in which it is stored, are losing it, and though they know it not, are living only by the recollections of what was once present within them. These are secret things with God; but the great and general truths remain, that nature cannot see God, and that grace is the sole means of seeing Him; and that, while it enables us to do so, it also brings us into His Church, and is never given us for our illumination, but it is also given to make us Catholics.

What joy and what thankfulness should be ours, whom God has brought—as He brought Newman himself, and perhaps by means of the great Cardinal's works—into the Church of His Son! To find ourselves here in the region of light, in the home of peace, in the presence of Saints, to find ourselves where we can use every faculty of the mind and affection of the heart in its perfection because in its appointed place and office, to find ourselves in the possession of certainty, consistency, stability, on the highest and holiest subjects of human thought, to have hope here and heaven hereafter, to be on the Mount with Christ, while the poor world is guessing and quarreling at its foot, who among us shall not wonder at his own blessedness, who shall not be awestruck at the inscrutable grace of God, which has brought him, not others, where he stands? "Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know," not conjecture, or suppose, or opine, but "know," see, "all things." "And as it hath taught you, abide in Him." You can abide in nothing else; opinions change; conclusions are feeble; inquiries run their course; reason stops short; but faith alone reaches to the end, faith only endures.

Here, then, is a lesson from Newman, almost entirely in Newman's own words; and to let him thus speak for himself is surely all that is needed to refute the Modernists' misrepresentation of his teaching concerning the authority of the Church, the development of her doctrine, and faith in her definitions and dogmas. And we cannot, perhaps, better conclude our lesson than by a reminder of his warning against the rationalism that is so opposed to his teaching: "Rationalism," he tells us, "is a certain abuse of Reason; that is, a use of it for purposes for which it never was intended, and is unfitted. To rationalize in matters of Revelation is to make our reason the standard and measure of the doctrines revealed; to stipulate that those doctrines should be such as to carry with them their own justification; to reject them, if they come in collision with our existing opinions or habits of thought, or are with difficulty harmonized with our existing stock of knowledge. And thus a rationalistic spirit is the antagonist of Faith; for Faith is, in its very nature, the acceptance of what our reason cannot reach, simply and absolutely upon testimony." [7]

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NEWMAN'S "PROBABILITIES."

EARLY in his Oxford career Newman's principles on probable knowledge involved him in trouble. These same principles still perturb his following and his memory. In the first chapter of the *Apologia* he has to mention that his use of the *Analogy* theory of probability as the "guide of life" brought on him the charge of "scepticism" and gained for him "many hard names." The case is yet more serious at the present day, when his Catholic orthodoxy is called in question, and not only harsh but evil epithets are suggested by his being dragged into association with sowers of error. It is also his maturest views on the relation of logical *probability* to religious *assent* that are now arraigned or trifled with.

[7] *Essays Crit. and Hist.*, vol. 1, p. 31.

There seems no great presumption in saying that unfavorable opinions of the great convert's principles were and are for the most part misunderstandings. Yet to misunderstand his mind, or at least his teaching, is not very excusable. In his finished works he is most careful to mark the sense of his propositions and the limit of his conclusions; his wonderful style, too, consists in a choice of terms that unfailingly convey his meaning and can never be justly made to mean anything different. This holds most specially in his delicate and complex doctrines of probability and assent, doctrines which, as he himself remarked, run through very much of what he wrote, and even underlie most of his controversy.

Wishing not to be misunderstood on this fundamental matter, he took care to premise "that as there were probabilities which sufficed for certitude, so there were other probabilities which were legitimately adapted to create opinion." [1] With probabilities that lead merely to opinion—probabilities, in fact, in the common acceptance—he has little to do, as little as with doubt: his main drift is to certitude and credence. He notices, however, that those probabilities are easily misused, so that their result, which is only *opinion*, is sometimes put for certitude. "This is really the sense," he writes, "which Protestants give to the word [opinion] when they interpret it by conviction; for their highest opinion in religion is, generally speaking, an assent to a probability—as even Butler has been understood or misunderstood to teach—and therefore consistent with toleration of its contradictory." [2] We may note that for Newman it is *Protestant* to lean *assent* on a *probability*, and inconsistent to tolerate the contradictory of what we believe.

He was strong against that course from his Anglican days. Not the, to him, most gracious influence of Keble could get him to ascribe "the firmness of assent" to a probability, even as "put to account by faith and love." He was dissatisfied with the view because "it did not go to the root of the diffi-

[1] *Apologia*, p. 21.

[2] *Grammar of Assent*, p. 59.

culty" and "did not even profess to be logical." "Accordingly," he says, "I tried to complete it by considerations of my own." Whoever will not take the trouble to follow out these *considerations* is liable to mistake Newman. He *mentions* that they are found in various of his works; but it is worthy of attention that in his latest annotations he refers inquirers on the point to his *Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent.* Words of his, here reproduced, are taken from the *Grammar,* when not otherwise marked.

In passing, it may not be out of place—though less incident to this question than to others—to animadvert on the blatant injustice of quoting indifferently Mr. Newman of Oxford for John Henry Cardinal Newman of the Title of St. George. It sometimes happens that the Prince of the Church is still credited with unregenerate early opinions qualified by himself with the clause—"which I have utterly renounced and trampled upon since." [3]

Taking the Butler adage that probability is the guide of life in a very practical application—"the province of certitude being so contracted, and that of opinion so large"—he explicitly warned against its abuse. "The danger," he wrote, "of this doctrine, in the case of many minds, is its tendency to destroy in them absolute certainty, leading them to consider every conclusion as doubtful, and resolving truth into an opinion, which it is safe indeed to obey or to profess, but not possible to embrace with full internal assent." [4] The *absolute certainty* to which alone he would give *assent,* he saw possible as "the result of an *assemblage* of concurring and converging probabilities." In given circumstances he found that such a concurrence and convergence excluded all doubt, all entirely, not even restricting it to prudent or reasonable doubt. But is not this moral certitude? It is, and of the strictest kind. Why then does he not call it so? He declared that he avoided the expression on account of its vagueness. Some may object that still vaguer are his "probabilities" which result in

[3] *Apologia,* p. 52.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 19.

"absolute certitude." The allegation need not here be contradicted, not more than Newman's system of logic need here be defended. That system—if he would admit that it exists—appears to labor under the deficiencies incident to every system that is not genuinely Scholastic. But what can and must be maintained is that his "probabilities" leave no room for doubt, because they never tolerate a possible contradictory. He repeatedly states what he means by them. They are "founded on certainties"; they are just "arguments which taken in the letter and not in their full implicit sense are but probabilities"; they are "proofs short of demonstration separately"; they are "partially-proved truths," truths for which "the full etiquette of logical requirements has not been satisfied."

Clearly, then, he wants our assent, not to what we commonly call a probability, but to a certainty of which the *probatio* has not been carried out to the end. Here we may surmise an etymological reason for his calling such certainties "probabilities"—that, namely, the proofs could be further demonstrated, were such a course convenient or necessary. But, few subjects of human interest lend themselves to complete scientific demonstration, and still fewer human beings are trained to follow up such a process; whilst all necessary truths can be seized and embraced by the common run of men on very informal but authoritative presentation.

That the matters assented to on Newman's "probabilities" are *truths*, is brought strongly to the front and insistently reiterated. The examples adduced are sufficient indication. There is question of such propositions as that he exists, that he was born, that he will die; that Britain is an island, that India is somewhere, etc., etc.; about all which he has "overwhelming certitude," though to work out a scientific demonstration of any of them might be either impossible or unsatisfying. Still more absolute, if possible, is his assertion that religious facts are truths, whether we demonstrate them or not. Comparing Christian knowledge with secular, he insists that we have "indefectible certitude in primary truths"—

under which province he includes much, saying: "As regards the world invisible and future, we have direct and conscious knowledge of our Maker, His attributes, His providences, acts, works, and will, from nature, and revelation." Earlier he had said: "Religion demands more than assent to its truth; it requires a certitude, or at least an assent which is convertible into certitude on demand." The sense of this latter qualification is found in the fact that he takes the English term *certitude* as implying reflex action, as meaning "I know that I know." He adds: "Certitude then is essential to the Christian; and if he is to persevere to the end, his certitude must include in it a principle of persistence." The substantiating of these propositions may be taken as his final aim in writing the *Grammar*, for he limits its scope by saying: "I would confine myself to the truth of things, and to the mind's certitude of that truth." [5]

Had it been in Newman's way and line to use the technical school terms, how orthodox would he not appear! The *certitudo subjectiva* of faith he always requires, at least *subjectiva*, more often *absoluta*; so that there be in the believer's mind neither doubt nor reserve. The *certitudo objectiva* he likewise demands, for the things proposed are *truths*, and are *legitimately proved*, even when not scientifically demonstrated.

Some prejudice, however, to his teaching is caused by his apparent readiness to get on without demonstration. But here again he has to be taken as he presents himself, and not as others may imagine him; nor are his words to be but approximately interpreted. His distinctions are fine. He most variously urges us to certainty on things natural and supernatural; yet he takes care to say that "reason never bids us be certain except on an absolute proof." Now, an absolute proof is manifestly some demonstration. He is as categoric as Aristotle—whom, by the way, he calls in these matters his master—about the statement that "truth certainly, as such, rests upon grounds intrinsically and objectively and abstract-

[5] *Gram. of Assent*, pp. 220, 239, 344.

edly demonstrative." He also maintains that "the fact of revelation is in itself demonstrably true," propounding, of course, that religious truths natural and revealed, "may be proved and defended by an array of invincible logical arguments." He, indeed, characteristically adds that "such is not commonly the method in which these same logical arguments make their way into our minds." [6] But his most explicit statement of his own position on demonstrative methods is found when the *Grammar* has brought him to the vital question of winning assent to our actual Revealed Religion from more or less indifferent listeners and readers. He candidly says: "I am suspicious then of scientific demonstrations in a question of concrete fact, in a discussion between fallible men. However, let those demonstrate who have the gift; 'unusquisque in suo sensu abundet.' For me, it is more congenial to my own judgment to attempt to prove Christianity in the same informal way in which I can prove for certain that I have been born into this world, and that I shall die out of it." [7]

There is here no abandonment of religion's objective truth, or of its evidence, or of its demonstrability; there is but question of a choice of procedure in propagation and controversy. Newman did think the informal inducements to belief, in themselves, more in accordance with "the constitution of the human mind and the will of its Maker"; but his pervading preference for them sprang from his conviction that they influenced millions when formal demonstrations would not reach tens. The man's love of communicable truth was always in play; 'twas that made him an irresistible controversialist and a most potent preacher. There is acumen as well as pathos in his grievance against Locke, who would limit the acceptance of doctrines to the exact measure of their logical demonstration. Newman writes: "It does not seem to have struck him that such a philosophy as his cut off from the possibility and the privilege of faith all but the educated few, all but the learned, the clear-headed, the men of practised intellects and balanced

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 336.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 411.

minds, men who had leisure, who had opportunities of consulting others, and kind and wise friends to whom they deferred. How could a religion ever be Catholic, if it was to be called credulity or enthusiasm in the multitude to use those ready instruments of belief, which alone Providence had put in their power?" [8]

This was written when the author was on the point of being received into the Church, and a more intimate knowledge of her Magisterium only increased his conviction that the reasonableness of Revelation authoritatively proposed, rather than scientific demonstration, commonly won the required assent. He depended more on truth's effectiveness than on force of discussion, holding as a principle that "false ideas may be refuted indeed by argument, but by true ideas alone are they expelled." [9]

Freely put in English, his informal reasons for believing are quite equivalent to the *motiva credibilitatis* of formal theology. They are various for various persons, and they may be most variously proposed. 'Tis a commonplace to recall that the *motiva* for *pueris et indoctis* are not always suited to *sapientibus*, that in fact—as DeLugo notes (De Fide, v. 36)—the *motiva fortissima* for the one class of persons might be *debilia* for the other. These considerations weighed much with Newman, the more perhaps that experience made him extend very wide the category of *pueri et indocti*. Not, certainly, that he could not or would not build clinching complexities of argument for those who wished to wrestle with them. Witness his summary of the process of drawing concrete conclusions from reasonings partially implicit: "It is by the strength, variety, or multiplicity of premises, which are only probable, not by invincible syllogisms,—by objections overcome, by adverse theories neutralized, by difficulties gradually clearing up, by exceptions proving the rule, by unlooked-for correlations found with received truths, by suspense and delay

[8] *Devel. of Chr. Doctrine*, p. 328.

[9] *Apologia*, p. xxii.

in the process issuing in triumphant reactions,—by all these ways, and many others, it is that the practised and experienced mind is able to make a sure divination that a conclusion is inevitable, of which his lines of reasoning do not actually put him in possession." [10] Or take the *Essay's* irresistible last hundred pages in which sustained argument hurries on, pulverizing Gibbon in its course, and, sweeping through Natural Religion with its defects and yearnings, through the Mosaic Dispensation with its sanctions and promises, through the New Law with its martyr-propagation and deathless hope, finally lands all truth-lovers in exultant joy at the feet of Christ the only Conqueror.

A clause in the last excerpt may be one of those which has caused sporadic dissatisfaction. 'Tis there said that the mind is able to make a "sure divination" that a conclusion is inevitable. But whoever attends to the whole drift of the passage will readily perceive that the *divining* is not from the mind alone, or unaided, or without objective evidence. This is the suspicion sometimes cast upon Newman's strong appreciation of the personal element in all mental acts. His use of the cognate term *instinct* has possibly deepened the umbrage. He postulates permission to let the word be understood of "a perception of facts without assignable media of perceiving," and he goes on to give examples which, in more scholastic works, would fall under the *vis cogitativa*. But be it remarked that there is a *perception* of *facts*, and that there are *media* of perceiving, even though they be not clearly assignable; so that the working of this "instinct" is no mere internal blind leading: in substance it is reason acting on evidence. The adduced examples are plain proof. "Presence of mind," he says, "fathoming of motives, talent for repartee, are instances of this gift." [11] Undoubtedly we have here another reminder that in dealing with Newman his terms are to be taken very exactly, and that not infrequently a whole passage has to be weighed to get the value of a single word.

[10] *Gram. of Assent*, p. 321.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 334.

In this " instinct " connexion most hurtful insinuations have been made against his teaching: the Protestantism of going by mere internal impulse, and the Kantism of concluding on purely subjective motive, have been surmised as possible under-currents of his thought. This comes especially of the misunderstanding of his famous *Illative Sense.* The expression is not, of course, exclusively his, yet so distinctively has he employed it that all reference to it, at least in English, is likely to recall the main trend of his *Essay's* argumentation. He set out to determine an *organon investigandi,* a means of investigating the truth of things and that truth's relation to the mind, and his *organon* is practically the Illative Sense. If this were the same as instinct, its investigations of truth could hardly be considered of much importance. But it is, in Newman's use, something very different. Even taking his qualified acceptance of *instinct* as a *perception,* that would still be brought no closer to the Illative Sense than is simple apprehension to judgment. Nor did he leave his meaning vaguely indefinite. It is of the ratiocinative faculty that he remarks—" the perfection or virtue of which I have called the Illative Sense "; and more precisely: " It is the mind that reasons, and that controls its own reasonings, not any technical apparatus of words and propositions. This power of judging and concluding, when in its perfection, I call the Illative Sense." [12] So, it is the individual reason, when trained, perfected, and actually exercised in grasping propositions and drawing conclusions, that he designates as the illative or inferential faculty, and not at all any blind or naturally determined impulse. Yet somewhat authoritatively, with indeed explicit reference to other writers, *instinct, illative sense,* and *internal experience,* have been classed as *synonyms.*[13] They are not synonymous in Newman's vocabulary, nor can the keenness of his argumentative method be fairly represented where they are so understood.

[12] *Gram. of Assent,* pp. 345, 353.

[13] See Mazella, de Virt. Inf., p. 368.

However, it is the "probability" characteristic of his demonstrations that has recently been most in question. It is pretended that there may be established some connexion between diverse statements of his on assent-premiss dependence and Proposition xxv of last July's condemned list. The reproved doctrine is that "*assensus fidei ultimo innititur in congerie probabilitatum.*" Now between this proposition and any sentence of Newman there is no equality whatever; there is not even verbal similarity, which some appear inclined to admit, not at least for one who remembers the incomparably exact writer's choice and delimitation of terms. For in the first place, he is not occupied with the *assensus fidei* when he is treating of "probabilities." He is declaring what seems to him common, practical, easy means of being *certain*, whether the matter in hand be secular or religious. Absolute certainty he supposes before he allows any assent at all. For him "assent is the acceptance of truth," and is always "an adhesion without reserve or doubt." Only indirectly is the question of faith drawn into his *Essay*; but when it comes, with what characteristic piety and penetration does he not touch its two supernatural elements, Revelation and heavenly assistance! "Assent," he writes, "is always assent; but in the assent which follows on a divine announcement, and is vivified by a divine grace, there is, from the nature of the case, a transcendent adhesion of mind, intellectual and moral, and a spiritual self-protection, beyond the operation of those ordinary laws of thought, which alone have place in my discussion." [14]

Surely this is a statement of the case very different from the condemned pretence of faith's "finally depending upon a mass of probabilities." And, naturally, Newman would keep clear of any equivalent expression; for his reading was ecclesiastically too wide and too exact to leave him ignorant of Innocent XI's having condemned (1649) the proposition: *Assensus fidei supernaturalis et utilis ad salutem stat cum*

[14] *Gram. of Assent*, p. 187.

notitia solum probabili revelationis — a condemnation whose history might help to account for the recent one better than any passage in the Cardinal's writings.

There occurs indeed, as already mentioned, the phrase—"an assemblage of concurring and converging probabilities," in the beginning of the *Apologia,* but with the context to indicate that these probabilities can point only to an undoubted fact or truth. There is a similar expression, similarly used, in the last chapter of the *Grammar of Assent.* It is in connexion with the theologian Amort's "new, modest, and easy way of demonstrating the Catholic Religion"—a treatise dedicated to Benedict XIV. "In this work he adopts," says Newman of Amort (p. 411), "the argument merely of the *greater* probability; I prefer to rely on that of the *accumulation* of various probabilities; but we both hold (that is, I hold with him), that from probabilities we may construct legitimate proof, sufficient for certitude." Notice always that, in the Cardinal's advance to assent, we find on final analysis—*demonstration, argument, proof, certitude.* Not less, but rather more grounds does he require than does Amort; and yet the theologian was establishing the *summa Religionis certitudo.* That, admittedly, could not stand on a mere probability which might tolerate a contradictory; nor was anything similar pretended. Amort found most Protestants, as Newman found most Englishmen, settling down, after the beating of many tempests of discussion, on the dull sands of hopeless doubt; and both set about showing the sad unbelievers that they really still held enough to rise to firm certainty. You at least think, Amort argued, the Catholic Religion, as a whole, evidently more probable than any other; and plainly God could not let any other religion but His be *evidently the more probable*: so you must think the Catholic Religion God's religion. For all those who accept the two premises, the conclusion here is certain, may even be called metaphysically certain; for it finally leans on the necessarily wise and loving character of God's providence. Roundly taken, Newman's religious arguments issue in conclusions of this kind; and 'tis with the issue rather

than the process that he is concerned. Indeed, if not indifferent about the process of reasoning, he can speak of it with an apparent want of appreciation, with, some may think, a trace of the "wantonness or negligence" of which once on a time he humbly accused himself. Amusing instances of this temper are found in some of his gentle retorts. Having referred to the principles rather than the arguments which brought him into the Church, he adds: "But, let it be observed, that I am stating a matter of fact, not defending it; and if any Catholic says in consequence that I have been converted in a wrong way, I cannot help that now." [15] To those who would blame people for concluding informally though correctly, he says: "And should it be objected that this is an illogical exercise of reason, I answer, that since it actually brings them to a right conclusion, and was intended to bring them to it, if logic finds fault with it, so much the worse for logic." [16]

When, as here, he hits logic, it is always for him "paper logic." But whether it was not the absence of Scholastic logic from his own formative period that left him open to the imagination of a possible antagonism between true logical processes and correct mental action, is a debatable question. In substance, however, his contention is ever the safe one, that, namely, we have good grounds and that we reason on them to good conclusions. As it is in natural knowledge, so is it in supernatural, the grounds of the latter being God's word infallibly presented by His Church. On this crucial point no man can be more decisively outspoken than is the author of the *Grammar of Assent*—though, as he recalls, faith is not directly his subject. Having touched on truths which reach people they know not whence, he continues: "But the very idea of Christianity in its profession and history, is something more than this; it is a 'Revelatio Revelata'; it is a definite message from God to man distinctly conveyed by His chosen instruments, and to be received as such a message; and therefore to be positively acknowledged, embraced, and maintained as true,

[15] *Apologia*, p. 200.

[16] *Gram. of Assent*, p. 403.

on the ground of its being divine, not as true on intrinsic grounds, not as probably true, or partially true, but an absolutely certain knowledge, certain in a sense in which nothing else can be certain, because it comes from Him who can neither deceive nor be deceived." And as a matter of elementary instruction, he had said of the Church, when treating of *real* assents: "To her is committed the care and the interpretation of the revelation. The word of the Church is the word of the revelation. That the Church is the infallible oracle of truth is the fundamental dogma of the Catholic religion; and 'I believe what the Church proposes to be believed' is an act of real assent, including all particular assents, notional and real; and while it is possible for unlearned as well as learned, it is imperative on learned as well as unlearned."[17]

Is it not strange that those who by their "synthesis of all heresies" would undermine the authority not only of the "*infallible oracle of truth*" but also of the "*definite message from God*," should seek support in the writings above quoted? The Modernist who plumes himself on the ideas of the *Grammar of Assent*, must be wanting in one of two things, either in depth or in sincerity. No principle of his is there uncontradicted. And the other works are equally destructive of his positions. Who has not noticed Newman's relentless antipathy to liberalism? In the *Biglietto Speech* at Rome, he marked his abiding attitude toward it. "I rejoice to say," he solemnly averred, "to one great mischief I have from the first opposed myself. For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the best of my powers the spirit of liberalism in religion." Renewing his long-standing protest against this "great *apostasia*," this most "cleverly framed device of the Enemy," he indicated its general character and seemed to be describing, by anticipation, the very vagaries of *Modernism*. "It is," he affirms, "inconsistent with any recognition of any religion as *true*. It teaches that all are to be tolerated, for all are matters of opinion. Revealed religion is not a truth, but a sentiment

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 153, 387.

and a taste; not an objective fact, not miraculous; and it is the right of each individual to make it say just what strikes his fancy. Devotion is not necessarily founded on faith." [18]

There is here some evidence that Modernists are less original than they seem to think themselves. But much older foreshadowings of their tenets are findable in Newman's protests and strictures. More than seventy years ago he took a hand at drawing up sets of *condemned propositions.* Some which he attributed to Oxford liberals are inserted in his latest annotations to the *Apologia* (p. 294). Several of them are startling in their approximation to the Modernist ones proscribed last July by Pius X. The measuring of a religious doctrine's importance on its gaining reason's approval, on its tending to convert the soul, on its being congenial to man's moral and mental nature, etc., is there explicitly branded. Similarly the pretences that revealed doctrines must yield to scientific conclusions, that Christianity has to be modified by the growth of civilization, that, as received, it is not the religion most simply true—are word for word in J. H. N.'s black-lists of 1830-1840, though very recent they sound. Even the subterfuge of not interiorly accepting the competency of any authority on earth to interfere with what seems true and right to a man's private conscience, is not let pass uncondemned.

It may then be seen that the Newman of the *Grammar of Assent,* and even of the *Via Media,* is not more easily impressed into the service of *Modernist* error than is the great Cardinal who returned to England to be "as the presence of the Holy Father among" his people, and one of whose latest, perhaps his very last, words on all his teachings was: "I have been speaking all along under correction, as submitting absolutely all I have said to the judgment of the Church and its head." [19]

G. Lee, C. S. Sp.

Pittsburg Catholic College.

[18] *Addresses and Replies,* p. 64.

[19] *Gram. of Assent,* p. 503.

SHALL WE PETITION FOR THE "PROVIDA"?

THE new Engagement and Marriage laws which went into effect for the Universal Church on Easter Sunday, 19 April, 1908, are calculated, under the blessing of God, to be productive of a fuller recognition of the dignity of the great Sacrament of Matrimony. A truer religious realization of the mutually sacred duties of the parties united, and an appreciation of the solemn obligations to the State and Church, arising from the sacramental marriage contract, may be hoped for, as among the many benefits conferred on the Church and the world by the divinely-advised program of Pius X,—*the restoration of all things in Christ.* The position of the Catholic Church regarding marriage will have an influence on the entire Christian world. The State authority of Christian, even of some so-called Catholic, nations, has gone so far in the usurpation of spiritual power that it regards and decrees marriage to be a contract or status created by, dependent on, and solvent only through the State. In the future we may expect to see the Christian world dividing itself into two camps on Marriage, one under the standard of the Roman Catholic Church, the other governed by a pagan notion or by the so-called broad liberal view that marriage is subject only to the State, which must change or modify its matrimonial legislation according to the demands of advancingly lax public opinion.

So far as the writer has been able to ascertain by communications from all parts of the country, the dominant and growing sentiment of both priests and bishops is that the best interests of religion will be served by complete observance of the new engagement and marriage laws, hence adverse to petitioning the Holy See for the extension of the *Provida* to the United States. Many had wished for a prorogation in the execution of the decree. It is true the Holy See had given ample time to the Christian world in which to explain the new laws to the faithful; but it is equally true that we were slow about our duty. Many were awaiting official notice from

the Holy See or from the Apostolic Delegation at Washington; but the decree itself stated that the transmission of the decree from the Sacred Congregation to the Ordinaries of the world was the promulgation of the law for the Universal Church, and consequently the transmission or expedition from Rome and not the acceptance or delivery of the decree to the Ordinaries was the act which officially promulgated the law. And the official promulgation was not partial but universal. So too the fact remains, attribute it to what cause we will, that our people are not instructed as well as they should be on the decree *Ne temere*. Where this instruction has been neglected or defective before Easter, it should be given or completed after Easter.

A very general opinion seems to extend no sympathy to those who are willing to desecrate a Sacrament before a schismatic or heretical minister or before a State official. Our conditions, many think, do not warrant our Bishops in petitioning the Holy See that such wanton violation of the laws of the Church and such desecration of the great Sacrament of Matrimony be treated with indulgence. This inflexible position of the Church, which maintains that every attempt to marry, even in mixed marriages, before a minister or State official, is an empty, useless ceremony, marking only the beginning of a life of concubinage, will undoubtedly deter some, perhaps many, from beginning married life with such an indelible mark of dishonor on them, invoking as it does the wrath of God and perhaps a curse on yet unborn generations. It may make the Protestant party think twice before entering an alliance which he or she knows will have no binding force for the Catholic party.

A second reason advanced for not petitioning for the *Provida* is that it will be just as easy for us to reclaim those living in concubinage after an attempt to marry before a minister or State official, as if the Church recognized this sacramental desecration to be a true Sacrament. Very many of the laity thought that under the old legislation such an attempt of marriage was no marriage at all. Thus such parties who

wish to have their attempt of marriage ratified by the Church, can do so now as readily as before Easter.

If the attempted marriage ceremony be celebrated by a minister of any sect or denomination, the party or parties will incur excommunication, and it will be, as heretofore, a reserved case in every diocese of the United States.

If the attempted marriage take place before a Notary Public or Civil Magistrate, it will be a case that probably many of our Bishops will continue to reserve. Grave scandal will be given by parties in an attempt to marry either before a minister or State official, for which due reparation should be made, according as the bishop may see fit to prescribe. Excessive severity in some dioceses has in numerous instances prevented the reconciliation of many who sinfully but validly contracted marriage before ministers and State officials.

With the *Ne temere* in force the scandal of attempted mixed marriages before ministers and State officials can largely be repaired, by as public a wedding as possible from the parochial rectory.

A third advantage assigned in not having the *Provida* is that in very many instances of mixed marriages without the presence of a duly-authorized priest, it will be to the interest of the Catholic party to have no marriage at all. Very often the Catholic party, especially the Catholic girl, would gladly face the world disgraced, rather than continue a married life in which she sees there can be no happiness. Such separations will of course offer difficulties, because a legal divorce must be obtained, otherwise serious complications and conflicts can arise between the *Ne temere* and the various State laws of the United States. Thus priests and confessors must be exceedingly cautious in advising penitents involved in such invalid marriages to secure a legal divorce. The moral phase of such attempted marriages can be settled by the confessor, while the canonical should be referred to the Ordinary.

JOHN T. MCNICHOLAS, O. P.

Washington, D. C.



Analecta.

E S. CONGREGATIONE INDICIS.

DECRETUM.

Feria III die 17 Martii 1908.

Sacra Congregatio Eminentissimorum ac Reverendissimorum Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae Cardinalium a Sanctissimo Domino Nostro Pio Papa X Sanctaque Sede Apostolica Indici librorum pravae doctrinae, eorumdemque proscriptioni, expurgationi ac permissioni in universa christiana republica praepositorum et delegatorum, habita in Palatio Apostolico Vaticano die 17 Martii 1907, damnavit et damnat, proscripsit proscribitque, atque in Indicem librorum prohibitorum referri mandavit et mandat quae sequuntur opera:

Il Programma dei Modernisti, Risposta all'Enciclica di Pio X "*Pascendi dominici gregis.*" Roma, 1908.

Paul Bureau, La crise morale des temps nouveaux. Préface de M. Alfred Croiset. Paris, s. a.

P. Saintyves, La réforme intellectuelle du clergé et la liberté d'enseignement. Paris, 1904.

—Les Saints successeurs des dieux. Ibid. 1907.

—Le miracle et la critique historique. Ibid. 1907.

—Le miracle et la critique scientifique. Ibid. 1907.

Franc. Regis Planchet, El absolutismo episcopal en la república mexicana. Apuntes para la historia. Chihuahua, 1907.

Itaque nemo cuiuscumque gradus et conditionis praedicta opera damnata atque proscripta, quocumque loco et quocumque idiomate, aut in posterum edere, aut edita legere vel retinere audeat, sub poenis in Indice librorum vetitorum indictis.

Quibus Sanctissimo Domino Nostro Pio Papae X per me infrascriptum Secretarium relatis, Sanctitas Sua decretum probavit, et promulgari praecepit. In quorum fidem etc.

Datum Romae die 18 Martii 1908.

FRANCISCUS Card. SEGNA, *Praefectus.*

*Loco * Sigilli.*

Fr. THOMAS ESSER, *Ord. Praed. a Secretis.*

Die 17 Martii 1908 ego infrascriptus Mag. Cursorum testor supradictum decretum affixum et publicatum fuisse in Urbe.

HENRICUS BENAGLIA, *Mag. Curs.*

E S. R. UNIV. INQUISITIONE.

SAC. ALFREDUS LOISY NOMINATIM AC PERSONALITER DECLARATUR EXCOMMUNICATUS VITANDUS.

Sacerdotem Alfredum Loisy, in dioecesi Lingonensi in praesens commorantem, plura et verbo docuisse et scripto in vulgus edidisse quae ipsamet fidei christianae potissima fundamenta subvertunt, iam ubique compertum est. Spes tamen affulgebat eum, novitatis magis amore quam animi pravitate fortasse deceptum, recentibus in eiusmodi materia Sanctae Sedis declarationibus et praescriptionibus se conformaturum; ideoque a gravioribus canonicis sanctionibus hucusque temperatum fuit. Sed contra accidit: nam, spretis omnibus, non solum errores suos non eiuravit, quin imo, et novis scriptis et datis ad Superiores litteris, eos pervicaciter confirmare veritus non est. Quum plane igitur constet de eius post formales canonicas monitiones obfirmata contumacia, Suprema haec Sacrae Romanae et Universalis Inquisitionis Congregatio, ne muneri suo deficiat, de expresso SS.mi Domini Nostri PII PP. X mandato, sententiam maioris excommunicationis in sacerdo-

tem Alfredum Loisy nominatim ac personaliter pronunciat, eumque omnibus plecti poenis publice excommunicatorum, ac proinde *vitandum esse* atque ab omnibus *vitari debere*, solemniter declarat.

Datum Romae ex Aedibus S. Officii die 7 Martii 1908.

L. * S.

PETRUS PALOMBELLI,
S. R. et Univ. Inquisitionis, *Notarius*.

E S. RITUUM CONGREGATIONE.

I.

DE USU LUCIS ELECTRICAE ET DE CANTU MULIERUM IN ECCLESIIS.

R.mus D.nus Raymundus Ibarra et Gonzalez, archiepiscopus Angelopolitanus in Republica Mexicana, a S. Rituum Congregatione sequentium dubiorum solutionem reverenter exposcit:

I. Per decretum S. R. C. n. 3859, die 4 Iunii 1895, declaratum fuit lucem electricam adhiberi posse in templis non ad cultum, sed ad tenebras depellendas, seclusa omni theatrali specie. "Iamvero cum a nonnullis tale decretum nimis late interpretari videatur, ad controversias dirimendas quaeritur in particulari:

1. Licebitne apponere in altare in quo SS. Sacramentum publicae fidelium patet venerationi electricas lampades, sive tabernaculum circa, sive in vasis florigeris quae inter candelabra locantur?

2. Fasne erit imagines SS. Cordis Iesu vel B. Mariae Virginis iisdem electricis circumcingere luminibus, ad instar scilicet fulgidae coronae circa caput, lunae sub pedibus, vel ad modum solarium radiorum ad latera; et in capitibus duodecim Apostolorum linguas igneas effingere rubeis lampadibus?

3. Permittine demum poterit quod in lampadibus quae in Ecclesiae fornicibus pendent, candelae ex cera, fictis candelis electricis substituantur?

II. Per decretum de Truxillo n. 3964, diei 17 Septembris

1897 prohibitum fuit " ut mulieres ac puellae, intra vel extra ambitum chori canant in missis solemnibus ", idemque confirmatum est die 19 Februarii 1903. Attamen cum in *Motu Proprio* SS. D. N. Pii PP. X *Inter pastoralis officii* de musica sacra d. d. 22 Novembris 1903 praecipiatur ut " cantus gregorianus in populi usus restituendus curetur, quoad divinas Laudes mysteriaque celebranda magis agentium partem, antiquorum more, fideles conferant ", quaeritur: Licebitne permittere ut puellae ac mulieres in scamnis sedentes, ipsis in ecclesia assignatis, separatim a viris partes invariabiles missae cantent; vel saltem extra functiones stricte liturgicas, hymnos aut cantilenas vernaculas concinant?

Et Sacra Rituum Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti secretarii, exquisitis votis utriusque Commissionis, tum Liturgicae, tum de Musica et cantu sacro, omnibusque sedulo perpensis ita rescribendum censuit:

Ad I. Lux electrica vetita est non solum una cum candelis ex cera super altari iuxta decretum *Natcheten.* 16 Maii 1902, sed etiam loco candelarum vel lampadum quae coram Sanctissimo Eucharistiae Sacramento vel Sacris Reliquiis aut imaginibus Sanctorum praescriptae sunt. Pro aliis ecclesiae locis et ceteris casibus illuminatio electrica ad prudens Ordinarii iudicium permittitur: dummodo species non habeatur theatralis ad mentem decreti n. 3589 diei 4 Iunii 1895.

Ad II. Affirmative ad utrumque et ad mentem. Mens est 1^0 ut intra Christifideles viri et pueri, quantum fieri potest, suam partem divinis laudibus concelebrandis conferant, haud exclusis tamen, maxime ipsorum defectu, mulieribus et puellis; et 2^0 ut ubi officiatura choralis habetur, cantus exclusivus mulierum, praesertim in cathedralibus ecclesiis non admittatur, nisi ex gravi causa ab Ordinario agnoscenda et cauto semper ut quaevis inordinatio vitetur.

Atque ita rescripsit, die 17 Ianuarii 1908.

S. Card. CRETONI, *Praef.*

L. * S.

✠ D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen., *Secret.*

II.

PERMITTITUR USUS CUIUSDAM COMPOSITIONIS EX OLEO OLIVARUM ET CERA APUM AD NUTRIENDAM LAMPADEM ANTE TABERNACULUM.

Hodiernus Episcopus Carcassonen. a Sacrorum Rituum Congregatione reverenter expostulavit:

An permitti possit quaedam compositio ex oleo olivarum et cera apum ad nutriendam lampadem quae continuo ardere et lucere debet ante altare et tabernaculum ubi asservatur SSmum Eucharistiae Sacramentum?

Et Sacra eadem Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, exquisita Commissionis Liturgicae sententia, propositae quaestioni respondendum censuit: *Affirmative, nihilque obstare in casu.*

Atque ita rescripsit, die 8 Novembris 1907.

S. Card. CRETONI, *Praef.*

L. * S.

✠ D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen., *Secret.*

III.

DE USU PETROLEI IN LAMPADIBUS ANTE SS. SACRAMENTUM.

Sacra Ritum Cong. supplicationibus pro facultate permittendi petroleum in lampadibus ante SS. Sacramentum, ita respondet:

Servetur decretum n. 3121, *plurium dioecesium* 14 Iulii 1864, quo Sacra Rituum Congregatio, approbante Summo Pontifice, statuit. "Generatim utendum esse oleo olivarum, ubi vero haberi nequeat, remittendum prudentiae Episcopi, ut lampades nutriantur ex aliis oleis quantum fieri possit, vegetalibus."

Studies and Conferences.

OUR ANALECTA.

The Roman documents for the month are:

The following works are placed on the INDEX of forbidden books: *Il Programma dei Modernisti,* Risposta all' Enciclica di Pio X "Pascendi";—Paul Bureau's *La Crise Morale*; P. Saintyves's *La Réforme intellectuelle du Clergé, Les Saints successeurs des dieux, Le Miracle et la Critique historique, Le Miracle et la Critique scientifique*;—Francis Regis Planchet's *El absolutismo episcopal en la república mexicana.*

The HOLY OFFICE (INQUISITION) declares Alfred Loisy excommunicated from the Church.

S. CONGREGATION OF RITES decides that—

1. Electric lights are not to be used, either *on the altar* (where only wax candles are permitted), or as *substitutes* for the *prescribed lights.*

2. The *Motu proprio* is not to be interpreted as preventing women from taking part in *congregational* singing in church; but in churches which have a male (sanctuary) choir constituted for liturgical services, separate female choirs are not to sing at these services, unless the Ordinary for reasons of grave necessity permit it. For a more complete exposition of the decision see *Conferences* (pp. 562-65).

3. A mixture of olive oil and beeswax is permitted as a substitute for the pure olive oil required by the rubrics for the sanctuary lamp.

4. Where olive oil cannot be obtained, the Ordinary may permit the use of any other oil, preferably, however, of a vegetable product.

THE DANGER OF HASTY EMBALMING FOR BURIAL.

Qu. The all-important topic, "Death, Real and Apparent," as so ably exposed by Fr. Ferreres in his series of papers on the subject, and so clearly summarized by an article in the August

number (1905, pp. 168-172) of the ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW, has served to make evident the priest's duty, under given circumstances, regarding the administration of the last Sacraments.

The priest, then, may and should administer Extreme Unction, *because* the soul does not leave the body for some considerable time after the moment of *apparent death.*

Now, *this reason* has its clear bearing on the conduct of those called to *embalm* our dead.

Is it then proper to allow an embalmer, within one or two hours after the moment of apparent death, to *sever the jugular vein,* and to pour into the body two gallons of chemicals?

The expression of your opinion as to how one may best answer this very natural question, would, I feel sure, be gratefully appreciated by many of the clergy who subscribe to the REVIEW.

D. D.

Resp. It must be admitted that, in view of the now generally recognized fact that latent vitality remains at times in a body for several hours after the ordinary symptoms of death have appeared, the process of hasty embalming referred to by our correspondent should be checked. Hence, where this practice of cutting the jugular vein within one or two hours after a person is assumed to have expired is in vogue, it may be the office of the priest under whose notice the act comes to remonstrate with the undertaker, or to advise the responsible members of the family of the danger involved. There are also occasions when a priest may introduce such an admonition into the practical instructions which he gives to his people, in order to assist the laity to form a proper judgment of what they have to do, or what they should require from the person who takes charge of their dead.

Probably, however, there is less danger than there might seem to be, of jeopardizing actual life through the prevailing process of embalming our dead. In the first place, the embalmer who strictly follows the approved methods of preserving the corpse, rarely proceeds so hastily as not to allow some symptoms of almost positive extinction of life to manifest themselves. Very rarely, we believe, do practitioners now

sever the jugular vein, as it is apt to show disfigurement of the corpse. Physicians who have any doubt as to the possibility of suspended animation in a person seemingly dead, have various ways of determining the fact, some of which, being very simple, might commend themselves likewise in cases where a priest is called on to solve a practical doubt.

(1) Tie a string firmly about the finger. If the end of the finger becomes swollen and red, life is not extinct.

(2) Insert a bright steel needle into the flesh. If it tarnishes by oxidation in the course of half an hour, life may be considered not extinct.

(3) Inject a few drops of Liquid Ammonia under the skin. During life a deep red or purple spot is formed.

(4) Moisten the eye with Atropine. During life the pupil will dilate.

(5) Look at a bright light or at the sun, through the fingers held closely side by side. During life the color is pink; after death a dead white.

(6) After death a dark spot is said to form gradually on the outer side of the white of the eye, due to the drying of the sclerotic, so that the dark choroid shows through.

(7) Putrefaction is an absolute sign of death. Better wait for it, than run any risk of burying anyone alive.

Undertakers, before embalming a recently deceased body, are likely to use one or other of these tests. Moreover, the wound inflicted for the purpose of conveniently laying bare the artery into which the injection of the antiseptic fluid is to be made, will be apt to excite, by the painful irritation which it causes, such vital action as would indicate the necessity of caution.

On the whole, it seems to us advisable to leave the determination of the proper time for beginning the embalming process to such authorities as the physician who gives the death certificate, or to other seculars who may be directly responsible in the matter. The priest's functions seem to us to be limited under ordinary circumstances to the obligation of securing the benefits of the last Sacraments for persons prob-

ably still capable of receiving them, although seemingly beyond the power of material influences. For it must not be forgotten that, although the vitality, which we rightly assume to remain latent in the body after all outward vital action has ceased, offers a sufficient warrant for administering the last Sacraments, it does not necessarily follow that it affords a hope of restoring the bodily functions. The gradual ebbing away of the vital energies which is assumed to ensue on the last stages of certain diseases, may permit the priest to give the benefit of the doubt to the outwardly seeming deceased person who may have failed, whilst still in his conscious moments to receive the last Sacraments. But it does not impose any further obligation, except under very exceptional conditions. It is quite true that there may be a hastening of the end, under such circumstances, by the premature cutting of an artery; but this cannot be viewed in the same light as the culpable taking of life. It belongs rather to the category of such interference with the prolongation of life during disease as are superinduced by the use of drugs to allay pain. It is very much like the ordinary method of placing the corpse on ice, almost immediately after the last breath is drawn or of quick burial during epidemics. Such risks accompany every death and burial. We assume of course that the case does not present any features of wanton haste, where there would be reasonable grounds for delay before embalming the corpse.

VICARIOUS APPLICATION OF INDULGENCES TO THE LIVING.

Qu. Under the Indults comprised in the "General Absolution" granted to members of the three regular Franciscan Orders, I find mentioned (in *Benziger's Diary*, p. 82) the following: "The plenary indulgences granted at the General Absolution may be applied to the *living* as well as the *departed*."

Can this be correct? I am under the impression (and the theological textbooks I have consulted confirm this impression) that an indulgence, gained by a person performing the prescribed works of penance or prayer in a spirit of contrition, may be applied to the souls in Purgatory, if the terms of concession so

express it. But I have never heard of an indulgence being applicable vicariously to the living. I suspect the writer in the Diary made a mistake. If so it should be corrected, else it would be greatly misleading.

Resp. The statement in *Benziger's Diary* is correct and corresponds to a decision of the S. Congregation of Indulgences given in response to a request addressed by the Procurator General of the Friars Minor, Fr. Bonaventura Marrani, to Pius X, under date 22 August, 1906. The clause of the Indult that refers to this particular concession, reads as follows: "*Indulta seu Gratias*: Ut Indulgentia Plenaria, Absolutioni Generali certis per annum diebus impertiendae Religiosis ac Monialibus ejusdem Ordinis adnexa, *non solum pro Defunctis, ut Auctores tenent, sed etiam pro Vivis applicari possit.*"

It is quite true that this is a most unusual concession. But the inference that, because the Church has not in the past granted such indulgences, therefore it is beyond her province to do so in the future, is not warranted either in the logic of things or by any positive legislation or authoritative utterance equivalent to such. It is true that the common opinion of theologians seems to assume that the works prescribed for the gaining of an indulgence for the living must be performed by those who hope to gain the fruit of the privilege. An exception is allowed in regard to prescribed almsgiving, which may be supplied in the case of parents giving for their children, masters for their dependents, etc. But this opinion is solely based upon the prevalent practice of the Church, and not upon any theory or theological reasoning. The Sovereign Pontiffs, as dispensers of the treasures of grace committed to the Church, have invariably required that the measure of penance comprised in the prescribed indulgenced works or prayers be fulfilled as a *conditio sine qua non* by the person who desires to obtain the remission of the temporal punishment incurred as the result of a sin. But if the terms of concession expressly mention the fact that the indulgence may

be gained by a person other than the one who performs the works, then there is no doubt that the benefit of the indulgence can be transferred to such person. For an indulgence as applied to the living is simply a judicial sentence by which the temporal penalty due to sin is commuted. Now, although a person who undertakes to perform the works of penance prescribed by the conditions of the indulgence may not on his own authority apply these to another, the judge may accept them in behalf of another. The case is simlar to that of a prisoner receiving the governor's pardon. It is not in his power to transfer that pardon to a fellow-prisoner at will; but if the governor give his consent that the "pardon" be executed in behalf of another whom the original beneficiary may select, then the act is valid. Suarez [1] makes this plain, when, after describing the virtue of an indulgence and its application directly to the person to whom it is granted, he adds: "At vero, si ipsa forma et tenor indulgentiae exprimatur, ut sic operans possit talem fructum sibi vel alteri obtinere, tunc non est dubium, quin possit unus pro altero operari ad lucrandum illam indulgentiam, quia in Summo Pontifice non deest potestas." The same opinion is maintained by Di Lugo, and more recently by P. Palmieri, S. J., in a dissertation entitled "An lucratus Indulgentiam possit eam ex arbitrio in alterum transferre." [2]

WHERE SHOULD THE SECOND ABLUTION AT MASS BE TAKEN?

Qu. You would oblige me much if you could kindly give your opinion on the following rubrical doubt:

Pater *A* asserit "secundam ablutionem sumendam esse *in plano in cornu epistolae* sicut fit pro lotione digitorum ad offertorium quoties Missa celebratur coram Sanctissimo. Et ratio est quia *a*) Rubricae sunt clarae pro loco quo lotio facienda est, minime vero relate ad ablutionem; et sane quaenam esset ratio pro diversitati? (loquimur hic tantum de Missa lecta). *b*) Jam a multis annis ita

[1] De Poenit., disp. 52, s. 7, n. 6.

[2] *Analecta Ecclesiastica*, Feb. 1895, p. 89. Cf. also Beringer *Ablässe*, p. 79, ed. XIII.

egit etiam coram claris rubricistis quin aliquid audierit ab ipsis contra talem praxim, quam a sacerdotibus in rubricis peritis didicit; nonne sunt auctores qui talem praxim suadeant?"

Pater autem *B* asserit "secundam ablutionem sumendam esse in cornu Epistolae, sed *non in plano;* et ratio est quia sic clare affirmatur (*a*)in Caeremoniali Baltimorensi (P. I. cap. IV, n 7); (*b*)A. Wapelhorst, O. S. F. *Compendio Sacrae Liturgiae* (P. I. cap. V, art. XVI, n. 72)."

Resp. All commentators prescribe that when the Blessed Sacrament is exposed the celebrant should descend *in planum* for the washing of the hands at the *Lavabo.* This was never prescribed, however, by the S. Congregation of Rites, which, when asked, simply answered: *Servetur consuetudo, dummodo caveat ne terga vertat Sacramento.* (12 Nov., 1831.)

The rubrics indicate that at the ordinary Mass the second ablution be taken at the middle of the altar (Tit. X, n. 3.), although many authors prescribe the going to the Epistle corner and placing the chalice *on the altar* (unless the server be unable to reach the fingers in this position, in which case the celebrant is to hold the chalice in front of the altar).

An only exception with regard to *low Mass* is made to this rule, in the "Memoriale Rituum" (Feria V in Coena Domini, Tit. IV, cap. II, § 1, n. 19). The celebrant there is directed after the first ablution to place the chalice outside the corporal toward the Epistle side, genuflect, go to the Epistle corner, purify his fingers over the chalice *super altare de more,* return to the middle of the altar, genuflect, and take the ablution.

Perhaps an argument *ex convenientia* may be used. The washing of the fingers at the *Lavabo* is an *ablutio a sordibus,* which, when the Blessed Sacrament is exposed on the altar might be more appropriately done *extra altare*; on the other hand, the *ablutio* after Communion is made *ad cautelam pro sacris particulis quae forte digitis adhaerent,* and *ex majori reverentia.*

It should be mentioned here that the S. Congregation of Rites, when asked whether the priest should leave the middle of the altar for the *ablutio digitorum,* answered: *Serventur*

rubricae pro diversitate Missae (22 July, 1848) and later again: *Consulant auctores probatos* (30 Dec., 1881). But both of these answers have been eliminated from the authentic editions of the Decrees. Whence we may conclude that the "Memoriale Rituum" should be followed *ad unguem*.

Moreover, we fail to find a single writer on Ceremonies or a liturgist who speaks of the *descensus in planum* for the *ablutio digitorum* in the proposed case. This ought to be conclusive against the maintenance of a practice which is clearly abnormal, even if witnessed without remonstrance by eminent liturgists.

BENEDICTION OF THE BLESSED SACRAMENT BEFORE THE END OF MASS.

Qu. A young missionary priest who has to travel almost continually, visiting small groups of Catholics who are scattered over a wide district, has repeatedly been urged to give Benediction with the Blessed Sacrament, after Mass. He spends only a day in each place, where he has to say Mass in private houses. Now, it has been suggested to him to do as follows: Consecrate one small Host more than is required for communicating the faithful; keep this Host in the ciborium until the end of Mass, after which, without taking off the vestments, the usual chant for exposition is sung; then the blessing is given with the ciborium, and after the singing of the "Laudate" the priest consumes the Sacred Species, and the ablution (kept to that moment) is taken as usually. Would this practice be tolerated under the above-mentioned conditions?

Or, if there should be any objection to the celebrant's taking the Sacred Species after Mass, may he perform the ceremony mentioned immediately after the Communion of the faithful, and then continue the Mass to the end? Your opinion would be greatly appreciated. W. B.

Saskatchewan, Canada.

Resp. We hardly think that the suggested arrangement would be approved or tolerated if submitted to the S. Congregation. Benediction after Mass is not a necessity, and in

view of the benediction which the Mass itself conveys to the faithful, seems superfluous unless it can be made to take on the character of a special and solemn service such as the liturgy prescribes for it. Under the given circumstances it would simply imply an interruption of the Mass, and a violation of a series of rubrical prescriptions which are very essential to the maintenance of the dignity belonging to the celebration of the Holy Mysteries. Some of these may be here indicated. The rubrics prescribe that all fragments left over from the Holy Sacrifice, and the Hosts that remain to be consumed, shall be taken at the Communion in the Mass. The only exception to this rule is made when the celebrant *by chance* discovers a Host or fragments of the Consecrated Host, after his Mass. In this event, if there be no other Mass, and if there be no place in which to preserve the Host or the fragments, the celebrant is authorized to consume them after the Mass (De Defectu Intent., N. 3).

Moreover, the exposition above referred to in connexion with the Benediction to be given is what is known in the liturgy as "Private Exposition." The rubrics for Private Exposition require that the ciborium covered with its veil remain in the Tabernacle. It is distinctly forbidden to place it on the altar (S. R. C., 16 March, 1876).

Finally, there is the express prohibition of interrupting the Sacrifice of the Mass for performing any other ceremony whatever, unless it be so prescribed by the rubrics, or allowed by special legislation, as in the case of preaching at the Gospel, of addressing first Communicants, of giving the Nuptial Blessing, ordaining of priests, or consecrating of bishops.

These considerations lead us to believe that it is better to dispense with the Benediction service, and to concentrate all the devotion and reverence upon the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, by making it as solemn and edifying as the circumstances allow.

DO INDULGENCED BEADS TRANSFERRED LOSE THE INDULGENCES?

Qu. When beads have been blessed by the Pope (for no particular person), may they be used by the person who had them blessed but who intends to give them away? Or must the person to whom they are eventually given have them re-blessed in order to gain the Papal Indulgences?

Resp. The general interpretation of the Decree of Alexander VII forbidding the transfer (by loan) of blessed objects (with the intention of communicating the indulgences), under penalty of forfeiting the indulgences attached to the objects thus loaned, is to prevent on the part of those for whom these objects were in the first instance intended as gifts the arrogant assumption that they might dispense to others the indulgences by loaning the indulgenced objects at pleasure. Hence the *mere use* of the beads by a person other than the owner for whom they were blessed, does not strip the beads of the indulgences attached to them.

Thus they may be loaned to a sick person who cannot well fix his mind on prayer without the aid of some tangible reminder of the mysteries, such as the series of decades supplies, provided there is no intention of transferring the indulgences by such a process. In like manner a person may use the beads unknown to the proprietor without forfeit of the blessing. For like reasons a person who has a papal-indulgenced pair of beads which he wishes to give away, may legitimately use the same, without prejudice to the privilege of the blessing, if he have no intention of gaining the indulgences, which can only be gained by the person for whom the object blessed was primarily intended.

THE VINDICATION OF CARDINAL NEWMAN.

In conjunction with the two articles on Cardinal Newman in this number of the REVIEW we have the pleasure to give the subjoined copy of an autograph letter of the Sovereign Pontiff, commending the Bishop of Limerick's recent article on Car-

dinal Newman and the Modernists. The efforts on the part of those who have attempted to hide behind the name of the illustrious English convert have failed signally. Not only have they read into his always lucid writings a distinctly false meaning, as the articles in the present number of the REVIEW abundantly demonstrate, but they have likewise missed the lesson of humility and submission to authority which shines out of the learned Cardinal's books and life. It may be hoped that the partisans of Modernism will now cease their discreditable tactics, in so far at least as Cardinal Newman is concerned.

Text of the Letter.

TO OUR VENERABLE BROTHER, EDWARD THOMAS, BISHOP OF LIMERICK.

PIUS PP. X.

Venerable Brother, health and Apostolic Benediction:

We would have you know that your pamphlet, in which you show that the writings of Cardinal Newman, so far from differing from our Encyclical Letter *Pascendi*, are in closest harmony with it, has our strongest approval. You could not, indeed, have done better service alike to the cause of truth, and to the eminent merit of the man. There appears to have been established, amongst those whose errors we have condemned by that Letter, as it were a fixed rule that for the very things which they themselves have invented they seek the sanction of the name of a most illustrious man. Accordingly, they freely claim that they have drawn certain fundamental positions from that spring and source, and that, for that reason, we could not condemn the doctrines which are their very own without at the same time, nay, in priority of order, condemning the teaching of so eminent and so great a man. If one did not know what a power the ferment of a puffed-up spirit has of overwhelming the mind, it would seem incredible that persons should be found who think and proclaim themselves Catholics, while in a matter lying at the very foundation of religious discipline they set the authority of a private teacher, even though an eminent one, above the magisterium of the Apostolic See.

You expose not only their contumacy, but their artifice, as well. For if, in what he wrote before he professed the Catholic Faith, there may perchance be found something which bears a certain resemblance to some of the formulas of the Modernists, you justly deny that they are in any way supported thereby; both because the meaning underlying the words is very different, as is also the purpose of the writer, and, the author himself, on entering the Catholic Church, submitted all his writings to the authority of the Catholic Church herself, assuredly, to be corrected, if it were necessary. As for the numerous and important books which he wrote as a Catholic, it is hardly necessary to defend them against the suggestion of kindred with heresy. For amongst the English public as everybody knows, John Henry Newman, in his writings, unceasingly championed the cause of the Catholic Faith in such a way that his work was most salutary to his countrymen, and at the same time most highly esteemed by our predecessors. Accordingly, he was found worthy to be made a Cardinal by Leo XIII, undoubtedly an acute judge of men and things; and to him thenceforward, throughout all his life, he was deservedly most dear. No doubt in so great an abundance of his works something may be found which may seem to be foreign to the traditional method of the theologians, but nothing which could arouse a suspicion of his faith. And you rightly state that it is not to be wondered at if at a time when no signs of the new heresy had shown themselves, his mode of expression in some places did not display a special caution, but that the Modernists act wrongly and deceitfully in twisting those words to their own meaning in opposition to the entire context. We, therefore, congratulate you on vindicating with eminent success, through your knowledge of all his writings, the memory of a most good and wise man; and at the same time, as far as in you lay, on having secured that amongst your people, especially the English, those who have been accustomed to misuse that name already cease to deceive the unlearned. And would that they truly followed Newman as a teacher, not in the fashion of those who, given up to preconceived opinions, search his

volumes, and with deliberate dishonesty extract from them something from which they contend that their views receive support, but that they might gather his principles pure and unimpaired, and his example, and his lofty spirit. From so great a master they may learn many noble things: in the first place, to hold the magisterium of the Church sacred, to preserve inviolate the doctrine handed down by the Fathers, and, what is the chief thing for the preservation of Catholic truth, to honor and obey with the utmost fidelity the successor of the Blessed Peter.

Moreover, Venerable Brother, we give thanks from our heart to you, and to your clergy and people, for your dutiful zeal in coming to the aid of our poverty by sending the usual donation; and in order to win for you, and first of all yourself in particular, the gifts of the Divine bounty, and also to testify our good will, we most lovingly impart the Apostolic Benediction.

Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, the 10th day of March, in the year 1908, the fifth of Our Pontificate.

PIUS PP. X.

WOMEN'S FUNCTIONS IN SOLEMN CHURCH SERVICES.

Since the publication of the Sovereign Pontiff's command to establish a universal and thorough reform of the methods of liturgical singing which had been for a long time in common use, there has been much needless questioning, on the one hand, as to what the Pope meant, and, on the other, as to what it was possible to do in compliance with his evident wishes.

To one who is not disposed to fortify himself in a position which he finds it troublesome to give up, or to which he has committed himself by previous statements and doings that might make prompt obedience look like inconsistency, the whole matter would appear to be simple enough. There had been introduced into our church services certain recognized customs which, although not necessarily wrong, were in very many cases productive of harm to the faithful. The chief element

in this harm arose from the fact that the singing at the liturgical services had come gradually to be consigned to the care and discretion of men and women promiscuously gathered in organ-lofts, usually at the back of the church. This practice had two effects more or less injurious to faith and devotion. It caused the introduction of secular and at times frivolous music into the church services, and it gave frequent and easy occasion for disedification by the thoughtless or indevout conduct of the singers. These were as a rule engaged merely for their voices and without any consideration of their possession of either the faith or the reverence that would enable them properly to interpret the prayers they chanted in the name of a faith-inspired congregation.

Against these two classes of abuses the Holy Father provided a twofold remedy by positive legislation, regarding (a) the persons to be admitted to the office of liturgical chanters; (b) the quality of music to be sung at the liturgical services. The positive provisions of this legislation, briefly stated, ordained that—

1. The liturgical chant is to be assigned to specially trained persons—Catholic men and boys—who belong, so to speak, to the sanctuary (of which the liturgical choir forms an essential part).

2. Congregational singing, in which the people, in the body of the church, answer the liturgical prayers, is to be encouraged; it might supply or supplement the special sanctuary choir.

3. The music to be used in these services is to be of a definitely prescribed character, so as to exclude what is trivial and out of harmony with the devotional spirit of the sacred services.

These three points sum up, I think, the whole matter. The first in general excludes the service of women, since they are debarred from public ministry in the sanctuary. The second point includes women in the body of the congregation taking part in the common chant, with men and children. By a twisting of the literal interpretation of the law, a con-

clusion has been drawn from its words which frustrates the end of the law itself. The reasoning is this: Congregational singing is permitted and even commanded; but the singing of men and women gathered in the organ-gallery at the back of the church (since it is not that of a sanctuary choir) is nothing more than congregational singing; therefore, the forbidden system may continue, and so women are free to sing with men in the organ-loft, provided they sing the prescribed liturgical music.

Whatever may be said in behalf of the motive which prompts this interpretation of the Pope's *Motu proprio*, it is quite certain that it is contrary to the intention of the Holy See. In saying this we do not assume any prerogative of superior information as to what the Sovereign Pontiff may have in mind; we simply take the common-sense view, determined by the expressed motives and the declared line of action on the part of the legislating authority. The Holy See never had the slightest intention to prevent women from devout participation in the public services of the Church, by their taking part in the congregational chant, or by forming distinct choirs for devotional singing in church. Nor is there anything in the legislation which, rightly interpreted, leads to such a conclusion. But select mixed choirs, such as are in vogue for concert purposes in the performance of secular music, are forbidden because they open the way to abuses and are contrary to the spirit of the levitical service in the Catholic liturgy which the Church as heir to the ancient ceremonial of the Temple maintains.

In a recent decision of the S. Congregation about the singing of women in church, the mind of the Holy See is made still more clear. The question was, whether the custom of permitting women and girls to sing at the services on solemn feasts within the limits of the sanctuary choir, or outside of it (*extra ambitum chori*), may be retained. The answer was simply, no; that such custom is an abuse, and is to be abolished as soon as possible. (See *Analecta*, pp. 547-8, for text of the document.)

The the interrogator, fearing that this decision might be interpreted in such a way as to exclude women even from congregational singing, otherwise approved by the Holy See, asked further, whether women and girls, occupying their usual seats in the body of the church,[1] are permitted to sing in the unvarying parts of the Mass and Vesper services, or at least join in the hymns at the usual devotions. The answer was: Yes, certainly. And the Holy See, moreover, interprets its meaning: Men and boys, and in a measure also women, are to have their share in celebrating the divine praises during the public services of the Church. But choirs exclusively composed of women are not to be organized for such purpose when there is a regular male choir available for the liturgical services, unless the bishop have grave reasons for departing from the regular rule; and then with such precautions as will prevent the old abuses.

In other words, so we understand the law, the Holy See prohibits mixed choirs of men and women, in the hitherto accepted sense. It also forbids, for parish churches and cathedrals, choirs exclusively composed of women. Honest congregational singing, in which there is no return to the "mixed choir" as a separate (and usually paid) institution, is permissible in exceptional cases, for which the bishop must give leave. The decrees of the Holy See do not at all interfere with the proper custom in chapels of religious women, where the nuns in their stalls chant and answer the regular liturgy.

THE VESTMENTS FOR THE CLERGY IN PROCESSION BEFORE PONTIFICAL MASS.

Qu. The Ceremonial for the use of Catholic Churches in the United States says (Part V, Chapter VI, Article I, No. 10) that in the procession to the altar before Pontifical Mass priests may be vested in copes, chasubles, dalmatics, and tunics, apparently to enhance the solemnity. May this be done?

[1] Where pews are assigned to men separate from those for the women, as the questioner expressly adds.

Resp. Rigorously speaking, only Canons of the Cathedral may assume sacred vestments at Pontifical services, and then only when the ceremonies take place in the cathedral of which they are canons. (Decr. 2057 and 2136.) Canons of collegiate chapters may not do so. (Decr. 235 [18], 456, 1766, 1871.)

The custom, however, prevails in some places by which on extraordinary solemn occasions all the priests are vested in this manner. We are credibly informed that this occurred in Orvieto, Italy, in 1895, in presence of four Cardinals and more than one hundred bishops. Since we must assume that the authorities at Orvieto were fully cognizant of what the ceremonies and decrees of the S. C. of Rites prescribe, it would seem that where such custom exists it is also sanctioned.

THE "ORATIO PRO EPISCOPO" WHEN THE COADJUTOR BECOMES THE ORDINARY.

Qu. In case a coadjutor with right of succession becomes the Ordinary of a diocese, by the death, removal, or resignation of the bishop whose coadjutor he was, on which day is the *oratio pro episcopo* to be said at Mass, the day of his nomination as coadjutor or the day when he becomes Ordinary?

Resp. Formerly it was said on the day on which he succeeded the bishop, who died or resigned or was removed. At present the oration must be said on the day on which the Apostolic Letter *in forma Brevis* for the coadjutorship with right of succession was given. (S. R. C., 30 January, 1878.)

THE BISHOP AND THE "ABSOLUTIO AD FERETRUM" ONCE MORE.

In a recent number of the REVIEW we answered the question whether a coadjutor or an auxiliary bishop, who is at the same time vicar general of the diocese, has the right to perform the "Absolutio ad Feretrum" in the case where another priest had celebrated the Mass. The interpretation of the

words "ex Decretis hoc jure gaudere tantum Episcopum loci Ordinarium" seemed to warrant the conclusion, and the words of Van der Stappen "ergo neque parochus, neque canonicus, neque episcopus non loci Ordinarius" confirmed our reading that, since the vicar general enjoys the right of Ordinary, he also shares the privilege above-mentioned, provided he is at the same time a bishop. The Rev. Fr. A. Schulte, author of *Benedicenda* and *Consecranda,* has since then obtained from a leading member of the S. Congregation of Rites an opinion which limits the right of giving the "Absolutio ad Feretrum" under the above-mentioned condition to the bishop alone who administers the diocese, so as to exclude the vicar general even if he be a bishop. Father Schulte writes:

In the March issue of the ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW it is stated that an auxiliary or coadjutor bishop, if he be vicar general of the diocese, may give the Absolution after the exequial Mass, even if he does not celebrate said Mass. The reason given is that, being vicar-general, he is one, and of equal right with the ruling bishop of the diocese.

Some time ago I had occasion to refer this question to the chief official of the S. Congregation of Rites, and his answer was:

"Tantummodo Episcopus loci potest dare Absolutionem in fine missae defunctorum (sicut benedicere cereos, cineres, palmas) licet non ipse missam celebret. Vicarius Generalis, etsi charactere episcopali insignitus, non est episcopus loci. Est quidem *Ordinarius,* sed quatenus *Vicarius.* Porro exercitium pontificalium habet ratione characteris episcopalis, ideoque dignitas Vicarialis nil in hoc exercitio tribuit. Quod ita verum est, ut in decreto 4023 includitur etiam Vicarius Generalis (episcopus titularis) inter eos, quibus Episcopus loci nequit cedere thronum."

Ecclesiastical Library Table.

RECENT BIBLE STUDY.

Within the last few months the fourth volume of the *Dictionnaire de la Bible* has been brought to its close, and the first fascicle of the fifth volume has reached its readers.[1] The work is too well known to need either further description or commendation; but there is an article on St. Paul in the last part of the fourth volume, and a study on the Pentateuch in the first fascicle of the fifth volume which deserve special mention. In the present paper we shall have to content ourselves with a review of the article on the Pentateuch.

The Pentateuch. The author of the article on the Pentateuch is Eugène Mangenot, Professor of Scripture in the Catholic Institute of Paris. He gives us a summary of the results of the investigations concerning the names of the Pentateuch, its division, its text, its style, its Messianic prophecies, and its commentaries. The information given under these various headings is not new, but it is conveyed in a brief and clear form. M. Mangenot is able to do this the more easily because he has gone over the field of Pentateuchal study in his work entitled *L'authenticité mosaïque du Pentateuque.*[2] It can not be expected that the writer should refer to literature published or to finds made after his contribution on the Pentateuch had been printed. There is no reference, e. g., to the manuscript containing Deuteronomy and Josue in the Septuagint version, which was bought, together with three other manuscripts, by Mr. Charles L. Freer, of Detroit, at Cairo, Egypt, early in 1907, of a dealer named Ali Arabi, and which seems to have been written in the fourth or fifth century. It seems probable that this manuscript once contained also Genesis to Numbers inclusive.[3]

[1] Paris, 1908: Letouzey et Ané. [2] Paris, 1907: Letouzey et Ané.

[3] A fuller description of the four Freer manuscripts was promised by the *American Journal of Archæology* for the March number, 1908.

M. Mangenot devotes more than two-thirds of his article to the question of the authenticity of the Pentateuch. No need to say that the question is treated from a conservative point of view. The tendency of the writer, the character of the *Dictionnaire*, and the present attitude of ecclesiastical authority led one to expect almost *a priori* such a manner of treatment. It is very important at present that Catholic readers should understand clearly the nature of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, the theological *note* or certainty of the thesis, its main proofs, and the answers to its principal difficulties. The following summary may induce some of our readers to study M. Mangenot's article with more ease and profit.

1. *Meaning of Mosaic Authorship.* The Decree of the Biblical Commission concerning the Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch approved of by Pope Pius X, 27 June, 1906, allows us to hold the following views: *a.* Moses may have employed secretaries chosen and directed by himself in such a way that he could publish their work under his personal guarantee; *b.* he may have reproduced or utilized written documents or oral traditions in case of events preceding his time; *c.* slight modifications may have been introduced into the work of Moses without interfering with his substantial authorship, or inspired authors may have added a few chapters. The Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch does not imply that every word of the whole work has been either written or dictated by Moses, but that it has been published under his responsibility, and that it faithfully expresses what he ordered his secretaries to write in his name. That this view of the Mosaic authorship is not new, may be inferred from the opinion of a number of scholars, both Christian and Jewish, who wrote before the date of the Decree.

2. *Certainty of the Mosaic Authorship.* *a.* M. Mangenot does not mention any theologians who believe that the Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch is revealed in explicit terms. *b.* Méchineau is of opinion that it is implicitly and formally contained in revealed truth, i. e., that it is derived from revealed expressions by a mere explanation of terms, and not by

a process of reasoning in the strict sense of the word.[4] According to this view, it is an error in faith to deny the Mosaic Authorship. *c.* M. Mangenot himself,[5] Father Brucker [6] and others maintain that the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch has been only virtually revealed, i. e. that it is inferred from revealed truth by a process of strict reasoning. Thus connected with revelation, and taught by the ordinary teaching body of the Church, it must be regarded as theologically certain; the contrary teaching is not heretical, as long as it is not condemned by the Church; but it must be considered as erroneous, or at least as rash. *d.* Finally between the years 1887 and 1906 there appeared a number of publications which represented the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch as neither revealed nor taught by the Church, but as a debatable opinion; at that time, no ecclesiastical pronouncement had favored the contrary doctrine.

3. *Proofs for the Mosaic Authorship.* M. Mangenot derives his proofs for the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch from external and internal evidence.

a. External Evidence. The external evidence favoring the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is based on the teaching of the Old Testament, of the New Testament, of Jewish tradition, and of Christian tradition. If this fourfold testimony can be established, it is hard to deny that the Mosaic authorship is connected with revealed truth.

(*a*) *The Old Testament.* M. Mangenot shows that the literary activity of Moses and his relation to the Pentateuch is attested by the Pentateuch itself, and by the historical and the prophetical books of the Old Testament. He finds that the earliest testimony attributes to Moses explicitly certain portions of our present Pentateuch, notably Deuteronomy. Esdras, Nehemias, and the author of Paralipomena ascribe to Moses the redaction of the entire Pentateuch. The Old Testa-

[4] L'origine mosaïque du Pentateuque, p. 34.

[5] L'authenticité mosaïque du Pentateuque, pp. 267-310.

[6] Authenticité des livres de Moïse, *Études*, March 1888, p. 327; Jan. 1897, pp. 122-123.

ment, therefore, favors the Mosaic authorship of its first five books.

(β) *The New Testament.* Though some of the New Testament passages may refer to the Messianic prophecies of the Pentateuch, and not to the whole work, still Jesus and the Apostles spoke of the whole work in terms current at their time, thus attributing, at least indirectly, the Law to Moses. They shared the common conviction of their contemporaries as to the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch, and they gave expression to their belief, if not directly and formally at least indirectly and equivalently. Whenever they mention the author of the Pentateuch, they identify him with Moses. In order to prove that tradition has attributed a work to a certain author, critics do not demand that the writers who quote from it, should quote the whole work; it is quite enough if they attribute to the author the part which they happen to use. We must not require of our Lord and the Apostles, what we do not require of profane authors.

(γ) *Jewish Tradition.* M. Mangenot dates back the Jewish tradition concerning the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, at least to the time of the Babylonian Captivity: the author of the Books of Kings, Esdras, Nehemias, Malachias, the author of Paralipomena, the Septuagint translators are his pre-Christian witnesses. In the first century, he appeals to the contemporaries of Jesus Christ, to Josephus, and Philo. Then follows the testimony of the Jerusalem Talmud and of that of Babylon. The writer maintains that the tradition has been perpetuated in the Synagogue till our own times, admitting of only few and recent exceptions among the representatives of Jewish tradition. Some of the Rabbis have had recourse to notable exaggerations and fables in order to defend their tradition.

(δ) *Christian Tradition.* The Christian tradition concerning the Mosaic authorship starts with the belief of Christ and his Apostles. Among the Apostolic Fathers, M. Mangenot appeals to St. Clement and Barnabas; among the early Apologists, to St. Justin, St. Theophilus, and the author of the

Cohortatio ad Græcos; among the other writers of the first centuries, to St. Irenæus, St. Hippolytus, Tertullian, Origen, Marius Victorinus, St. Athanasius, Eusebius of Cæsarea, Diodorus of Tarsus, Didymus of Alexandria, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Ambrose, St. Epiphanius, St. Hilary, St. Chrysostom, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and many others. Christian tradition in its life during the Middle Ages and in recent times has been well described by Prof. Hoberg.[7] One is tempted to ask whether the thesis concerning the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is not supported by a clearer and more general tradition than many another doctrine which has become a dogma defined by the infallible authority of the Church.

b. Internal Evidence. M. Mangenot examines also the contents of the Pentateuch and its form as to their testimony in favor of their Mosaic origin.

(*a*) *Contents of the Pentateuch.* There are two characteristics in the contents of the Pentateuch which favor its Mosaic origin. Its author must have been well acquainted with Egyptian affairs, and he must have written for the Israelites after their exodus from Egypt and before their entry into the Promised Land. Moreover, the Egyptianity of the work is such that it fits in with the Egypt of about the fifteenth century B. C., but does not agree with the circumstances of the country about the time of the prophet Isaias. Still, the critics would have us believe that the writing, or the redaction, of the bulk of the Pentateuch occurred about the time of the great Prophet. We cannot here enumerate all the details which place the composition of the Pentateuch between the time of Israel's exit from Egypt and its entrance into the Holy Land; the reader will find this part of M. Mangenot's article both interesting and instructive. If then the contents of the work demand that its author must have known Egypt well, and must have written while Israel was in the desert, can we find any one who answers these requirements better than Moses?

(*β*) *Form of the Pentateuch.* Under this head M. Mangenot

[7] Moses und der Pentateuch, p. 72 f., Freiburg, 1905.

enumerates a list of peculiarities limited to the Pentateuch. These facts do not necessarily imply that Moses must have written the Pentateuch, but they fit in well with its Mosaic authorship. Various answers have been made to this argument; but it has not as yet been explained why these peculiarities should be found in the Pentateuch alone, not extending even to the Book of Josue.

4. *Difficulties against the Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch.* This section of the article comprises two parts: the history of the difficulties, and the answer to the principal exceptions.

a. History of the Difficulties. Some readers will find this part more interesting than the following; but we doubt whether they will derive as much benefit from it. After a general outline of the forerunners of the critical theories, M. Mangenot enumerates the various theories successively propounded by the critics: the hypothesis of documents, that of fragments, that of complements, and the new documentary theory. The former three of these are only of an historical interest; at present, we have to deal with the fourth theory. The four principal documents it assumes, the Yahvistic, the Elohistic, the Deuteronomic, and the Priestly, are briefly and clearly described by M. Mangenot. He tells us also how the various documents were combined by successive redactors.

b. Solution of the Difficulties. This section considers the critical method and the uncertainty of its conclusions, the general arguments against the unity and the antiquity of the Pentateuch, and the particular arguments derived from the Pentateuchal legislation and from philology.

(*a*) *Critical Method and Conclusions.* The following are the principal mistakes of the critics: they neglect external evidence; they appeal to anomalies of the actual text which are accounted for more easily in ways different from the critical assumptions; they deny the unity and the antiquity of the Pentateuch without supplying anything satisfactory to replace these two elements. Prof. A. H. Sayce, of Oxford, contributed to the *Homiletic Review* (July, 1907) an article en-

titled "The Documentary Theory of the Pentateuch: A Test Case"; referring to the critical method, he says: "We are told that it stands on the same footing as the facts of physical science . . . But the facts of science rest upon inductive evidence, and when we ask, what is the inductive evidence for the documentary theory of the Pentateuch, we find that it is not such as would be received either in a court of law or in a court of science. The critical analyst professes to be able to separate the books of Moses into documents of various age, defining the exact portion of verse or passage where the one begins and the other ends, or where a final editor has come to fit the two together so skilfully as to deceive all but the elect scholars of to-day. Hebrew, however, is a dead language, and when we ask the analyst to apply his method to our own English or to modern French, and similarly divide and dissect the novels of Besant and Rice, or Erkman and Chatrian, which we know to be composite, he is obliged to confess that he cannot do so. It is only to a dead language, imperfectly known, and of which but a fragment of its literature has been preserved, that his methods will apply. In the eyes of science such methods must stand self-condemned."

(β) *General Arguments.* Under this head M. Mangenot considers what the critics have said about the impersonal style, the anachronisms, and the so-called doublets of the Pentateuch. The first of these peculiarities may be due to the employ of secretaries; the second has been variously and repeatedly explained, all authors agreeing that it is partly due to glosses. The doublets are partly artificially construed by the critics, and partly due to the use of different sources, or to the objective repetition of the facts themselves. Prof. Sayce (*l. c.*) believes that the validity of the Documentary Theory can be tested in the flood story. A Babylonian version of it has been found, "the age of which can be approximately fixed." "If the critical analysis was right," the Professor continues, "the Babylonian version of the narrative would agree either with the Elohistic or the Yahvistic account discovered in the book of

Genesis; it could agree with the combined account as we have it in the present text of the Bible only if it was composed subsequently to the latter. But this is just what it does. Some of its details [the writer enumerates ten] are those found only in the so-called Elohistic portions of the Biblical History; others [he enumerates four minute details] are found only in the Yahvistic portions . . . Consequently, if the documentary theory is correct, the Babylonian account must either have been written after the Yahvistic and Elohistic versions had been pieced together into the narrative we now have in the book of Genesis, or else the Yahvist and Elohist, in spite of their not being contemporaries, must have agreed to copy the Babylonian story on the mutual understanding that the one inserted what the other omitted." The critics themselves do not admit the first alternative, and the second alternative is a chronological impossibility. Hence "the documentary theory breaks down under the first scientific test that can be applied to it."

(γ) *Particular Arguments based on Pentateuchal Legislation.* The critics contend that we find in the Pentateuch a threefold progressive legislation the first form of which is contained in the Book of the Covenant, the second in Deuteronomy, and the third in the Priestly Code. This they exemplify in the laws concerning altars and sanctuary, concerning sacrifices, concerning feasts, concerning priests and Levites. Moreover, they point out that according to the historical books of the Old Testament, the three successive legislations were observed in three successive periods. Hence they infer the composite nature and post-Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch. M. Mangenot deals with all these difficulties in detail, a process which space does not allow us to imitate. We can only indicate some of the principal features of his solutions: 1° The law concerning the unity of sanctuary was not intended to bind the Israelites before the erection of the temple in Jerusalem (Mangenot), or it referred to the public and national sacrifices, not to the private ones;[8] or again, the various names

[8] Van Hoonacker, Le lieu du culte dans la legislation rituelle des

occurring in the historical books are really only synonyms for only two or three places which successively were the one centre of worship in Israel.[9] 2° The four kinds of sacrifices were known in Israel before the time of Ezechiel. 3° In the same way, Ezechiel presupposes the distinction between the priests and Levites.[10] 4° The arguments drawn from the historical books are nearly in every case *argumenta ex silentio*, and M. Mangenot points out that the conditions under which alone they are valid are not verified.

(δ) *Arguments based on Philology.* M. Mangenot draws attention to various considerations: Our present Hebrew text has suffered in the process of transcription; in the case of Genesis, Moses probably employed various written sources; besides, different secretaries have different styles; again, different subjects demand different literary treatment. This whole argument has lost much of its apparent importance; but its particulars may be studied in the work of Mangenot,[11] Martin,[12] and von Hummelauer.[13]

CATECHETICS.

I. Reform of the Catechism The REVIEW published in the February issue a short account of recent progress in catechetical reform. It is of comparative worth to add another illustration of this progress, taken from a country which to American minds shows considerable backwardness in religion, namely Hungary. The new German Augsburg catechism

Hébreux (Muséon April-Oct. 1894, XIII, pp. 195 ff.; 299 ff.; 533 ff.; XIV, pp. 17 ff.

[9] Poels, Examen critique de l'histoire du sanctuaire de l'arche, Louvain, 1897.

[10] Cf. Van Hoonacker, Les prêtres et les Lévites dans le livre d'Ezechiel, *Revue biblique*, 1899, VIII, 180 ff, 192 ff.

[11] L'autheticité mosaïque du Pentateuque, Paris, 1907, pp. 56 ff., 85 ff., 111 f., 144 ff.

[12] Introduction à la critique générale de l'A. T., Paris 1886-1887, I. pp. 576 ff.

[13] Deuteronomium, Paris, 1901, pp. 138 ff.

represents ten years of labor. The new Magyar catechisms took only five years of hard work, but then reformers had before them such splendid German works as Linden's and the Augsburg catechisms, which two to-day easily surpass any others in the book market, Faerber's included, although Faerber's ranks among the best. The cumbrous Deharbe catechism had been used in Hungary for half a century past. For years prominent catechists had been calling the attention of the bishops to its defects.

It took so much to institute a reform simply because influential persons maintained that it was unwise to change materially traditional forms of religious text-books. As everywhere else, so in Hungary it became evident that much of the decay in religion was attributable directly to defective religious instruction, and this partially to defective text-books. In the year 1902 the Magyar bishops first took counsel about the reform of the catechism. Bishop Majláth of Transylvania was charged with the direction of the work. It is worth while to note how this reform was carried out. Public opportunity was given to as many *professional catechists* as possible to express their views and take part in the reform—without any unnecessary restriction of utterance. For this purpose Bishop Majláth before all else assembled the catechists of the country in Budapest. The conference was well attended. The bishops then appointed a committee of the best catechists in their respective dioceses and charged it with the work. The committee elected a referee, who with two other committee-members drew up a sketch of the future catechism. This sketch was printed and communicated to all the members of the committee, who in turn added their annotations and returned them to the referee. The revised sketch followed the same course. Furthermore, the whole committee of the country repeatedly held conferences under the presidency of Bishop Majláth and thoroughly discussed every phase of the work. After this the sketch was given to the public and everybody was invited either to draw up an independent sketch or present his remarks. The second sketch

was especially submitted to the bishops and their observations were carefully considered. Call this work red tape, if you choose. But it was crowned with deserved success. Everybody had to admit that there was nothing hasty and unconsidered in the work. The new catechism is now officially prescribed in most dioceses. A Croatian, Slovak, and even a German translation of it have appeared.

Deharbe's outlines were kept in the new catechism. The subject-matter was considerably abridged, here and there also amplified, made more practical and carefully divided for the different grades. There are three editions: one for the first and second grade of elementary schools, one for the remaining four grades (there are only six grades), and the largest for the higher schools. "Logical, correct, short, concrete" were the pass-words loyally followed in the elaboration. The catechetical matter is not everywhere *theologically complete*; yet it is correct and adapted to the needs of children and the people. Every superfluous word is kept out, and abstract phrases and definitions, where possible, are carefully avoided. Questions are given in easy, short, yet not childish sentences. Only here and there are the answers *yes* or *no*. Answers follow in complete sentences, as a rule containing the word-sequel of questions, but not more nor less than was asked, and they are intelligible without adding other answers. The catechisms are richly *illustrated*. The illustrations are mostly those of Schnorr; the elementary edition has them in four *colors*.

It is a fact worthy of remark and of imitation, that all continental reformers have dropped the idea of retaining *theologically complete* answers everywhere, in elementary catechisms. The Augsburg catechism, as an illustration, treats perfect and imperfect contrition thus: "When is our contrition 'perfect'? Our contrition is *perfect*, when we are sorry for our sins *out of love for God*.—When is our contrition 'imperfect'? Our contrition is *imperfect*, when we are sorry for our sins chiefly *out of fear of God*."—Compare with this the Baltimore catechism: "What is perfect contrition? Per-

fect contrition is the sorrow and hatred we have for sin, because we love God and have offended His infinite love and goodness." The new Magyar catechism says: "When have we perfect contrition? We have perfect contrition, when we are sorry for our sins especially because by them we have offended the infinitely good and lovable God.—When have we a less perfect contrition? We have a less perfect contrition, when we are indeed sorry for our sins also out of love of God, yet especially because we fear God, as we have deserved His punishment."

The debate as to the question-and-answer form of the catechism is still carried on in Europe and elsewhere and we all know that catechisms follow the analytical method. This form will doubtless remain in the Church, and after all it is of secondary importance. For the catechism is *chiefly* a memorandum-book and of importance only after the *preceding catechesis.* Provided the matter has been methodically well presented, the form of the catechism matters little; indeed, the present form possesses a distinct advantage. We need not think that the Church would have otherwise kept it for centuries, or that we may with safety radically break with traditional forms. We need a re-form.

In all the countries where the catechism is being reformed, the matter and the method have been studiously debated for years. In the United States the need of reform is admitted on all sides. Meanwhile it becomes imperative to learn, to search out what catechetical progress has been made. When this has once been thoroughly discussed, and discussed not in an amateurish spirit, we may safely venture on a reformation. And we might just as well bear in mind that the difficulties in the United States are much greater, owing to a diversity of local conditions and to the lack of homogeneity in our Catholic population. We have ten problems, where Germany or France or Hungary has only one.

II. A New Catholic School-Bible. In the early part of the year 1906 there appeared in Treves, Germany, a new Catholic

School-Bible[1] which deserves special mention. The author is Dr. Jakob Ecker, professor of Exegesis in the Seminary of Treves, and at the same time teacher of Bible-History in a private school. His book, *Katholische Schulbibel*[2] is an excerpt of the Bible, not Bible-History alone, and in this respect it is vastly superior to anything we know in this line. The illustrations, by Philip Schumacher, are distinctly original and up-to-date. If in anything, our old Bible History books excel in the miserableness of their illustrations. When we compare Benziger's New Century Readers with our catechisms and Bible histories, even in their material make-up, we may justly complain of didactic materialism. The holiest books we put into the hands of our school children are by far the poorest in their typographical get-up. And then we expect the child to love his religion. And we do not even seem to see this! So then, Ecker's School-Bible is a vast improvement in this respect. Our only objection might be the bulkiness of the volume. But the chapters are not too long; they are also divided into distinct paragraphs, with the theme indicated in heavier type. The book literally teems with artistic illustrations. Numerous little geographical charts are inserted *in the text*. Very noteworthy are the geographical half-tones, e. g. beginning with the New Testament we have true pictures of Nazareth, the Field of the Shepherds, Bethlehem, the Desert of Juda, the Place of Baptism, Mount Quarantana near Jericho, Mount Garizim near Sichem, the Pool of Bethesda, etc. The writer counted 48 such in the New Testament alone. There are likewise numerous text-illustrations, ethnographical, historical, numismatical, liturgical, topographical pictures, each worthy of note. Any teacher would be well repaid for the purchase of this book, by the illustrations alone, which can be profitably used in school.—In the Old Testament we get a glimpse, at least, of the Psalms and the Lesser Prophets; the New Testament contains the Gospels for all the

[1] Not Bible-History.

[2] *Schaar & Dathe*, Trier, 1906.

Sundays and the more important holy days. Besides this we have a full-page illustration of Jerusalem, of St. Paul's travels, and on the inside of the cover a very satisfactory map of Palestine at the time of Christ. A four-page introduction gives all that a child in the Grammar Grades need know about the Bible. And all this, with indices, makes not more than 390 pages. In any future new American School-Bible, for such it ought to be, this work of Ecker's cannot be overlooked. None of the illustrations is colored. This defect—as some will account it—is abundantly made up for by the artistic finish of the volume. We might postpone in the United States the preparation of a new catechism, until a new School-Bible, which is more important, is furnished for our school children. The Protestants were much quicker to avail themselves of the advance in the typographical art so that to-day they possess some remarkable School-Bible text-books.

III. Two Recent Catechetical Congresses. The writer has repeatedly noticed in catechetical reviews that French Catholics have lamentably neglected catechetical improvement. This may have been true in the past, but the times have changed. Under the presidency of Mgr. Amette, the new Archbishop of Paris, a National Catechetical Congress was held during the last week of February of this year. The Holy Father sent his blessing. The appended letter shows the great solicitude of Pius X for catechetical work. The letter is addressed to Mgr. Amette:

Most Illustrious and Reverend Sir:—

I have the pleasure to inform your most illustrious Lordship that the Holy Father has learnt with great delight of the convening of a National Catechetical Congress in Paris.

His Holiness regards with particular satisfaction the assembling of so many distinguished clergymen and Catholic laymen of France for research and study in this most important field, on which depends the full education of the minds and the infallible direction of the hearts of the younger generations.

His Holiness, who has in a memorable Encyclical expressly exhorted the Bishops of the Catholic world to promote with the

greatest care the teaching of Christian Doctrine, is rejoiced to take this propitious occasion to renew for his sons in France, and particularly for the ecclesiastics, this salutary advice.

The Supreme Pontiff is happy to add to the expression of his desire the Apostolic Benediction for all those who take part in the Congress.

Whilst making this communication, I beg to assure your illustrious Lordship of my sentiments of especial esteem,

Most devotedly,

CARD. MERRY DEL VAL.

It has been impossible up to the date of this writing to obtain a detailed account of the doings of the French Congress. But there are fuller accounts to hand now of the *Pedagogical and Catechetical Congress* held in Vienna at the end of February. There were not less than 483 participants, lay and clerical. This fact shows how very much alive to present-day needs of a proper religious education continental pedagogues seem to be. The keynote of the lectures was the training of heart and will in Christian Doctrine. As we have already given (in the March number of the REVIEW) a statement of the lectures, we cannot enter into it again here. Any American priest who is interested in this great work would do well to order the full account of the lectures and debates, which will shortly appear in book-form.[3] Most noteworthy at this Congress was an exhibition of objective helps for Christian Doctrine. It surpassed all such former exhibitions. The catalogue-list alone covers 20 pages.

We might add here that the First International Congress for Moral Pedagogy will be held in London, 23-26 September, under the presidency of Lord Avebury. The most noted pedagogues of Europe, among them Dr. Paulsen, of Berlin, Dr. Kirschensteiner, of Munich, and Dr. Foerster, of Zurich, have promised to take part.

[3] Verlag Heinrich Kirsch, Wien, I., Singerstrasse 7, price about one dollar.

Criticisms and Notes.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF RELIGION. A Series of Lectures. By John Watson, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons; New York: Macmillan Co. 1907. Pp. xxvi-485.

Professor Watson may probably be known to those interested in the book at hand as the author of several works of some merit on philosophical subjects. He here presents a body of essays on "the reconstruction and history of religious belief." One may admit "the importance of the problem" undertaken and "the pressing need of its solution," while protesting against the author's statement that "the appeal to external authority in any form does not in our day carry conviction, even to those who make it" (p. v). The critical reader may be startled at meeting, on the very first page of a book devoted to sober philosophy, with so wild a generalization, but he will need to steady his nerves at once, for they will be subjected to not a few such shocks if he have the patience to work his way through the volume. Convinced that "religion can find no real support in external authority," Professor Watson proclaims the only other alternative, namely, "either to abandon all systematic thought in this region or to rebuild our theological belief on the basis of reason" (p. vii). But why this dire alternative? the discerning reader may ask. Why may not "the basis of reason" be found broad and strong enough to support "an appeal to authority"? Ah, but then "the whole principle of authority was virtually overthrown at the beginning of the modern world with the Reformation and the Renaissance" (p. vi); and it were a retrogression to medievalism to attempt its reinstatement!

To establish what he considers the untenableness of the appeal to authority the author devotes two lectures, the first being specifically directed against Cardinal Newman's theory of development, the second against Dr. Wilfrid Ward's mode of defending religious authority. Various forms of Idealism — Critical, Personal, Speculative or Constructive — proffered philosophical theories of religious experience — are discussed in the third and fourth lectures. The author's own solution, Speculative Ideal-

ism, is here summarized, its fuller exposition being reserved for the concluding lectures of the volume (16 and 17). Two other lectures (6 and 7) are criticisms of James and Harnack, while the succeeding lectures (8 to 15 inclusive) are described by the author as "critical studies in the historical evolution of religious thought intended to cover its main movement and to show, in a concrete way, the process by which the religious consciousness has been gradually purified and enriched." Philo, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Leibnitz—these are the central figures and agents in the movement here pursued. So much for the general contents of the book.

We said above that the author's solution of the problem of religious experience is denominated Speculative or Constructive Idealism. The name, of course, means little or nothing for the uninitiated reader; nor are we sure that any summary such as could here be given would convey much more. The following passage embodies the author's own account, and may at the same time serve to illustrate the general character of his thought and style: "Speculative Idealism . . . claims that the personality of man presupposes the process by which the subject knows and realizes himself, not in separation from the world and God, but in the comprehension of both as inseparably bound up with the consciousness of himself. Man is capable of overcoming the world, because in it he discerns the operation of the principle of reason which constitutes his own true self, and because in realizing that self he is in harmony with the universal reason: he is capable of union with God, because there is no aspect of the universe which is not the more or less explicit expression of the Divine Reason" (p. 137). Let it be noted, lest any one should read a pantheistic meaning out of this passage, that Professor Watson takes special pains to exculpate his theory from any such imputation (p. 444).

But what of it all? When one has read through the book once and again, he carries away the consciousness that he has been brought into contact with the religious speculations of a number of great minds that have been criticized, usually understandingly (*e. g.* James, Harnack, Spencer), sometimes otherwise (*e. g.* Newman, Ward, St. Thomas), and lastly that he is offered a philosophy of religiousness (rather than religion), the permanent and universal elements whereof he knew very well before.

though he may have formulated them somewhat differently; while the individual and transient elements that belong to the author himself are due to the latter's subjective limitations and personal attitude which apparently prevent him from seeing (*pace tanti viri dico*) that reason leads up to and establishes the rationality of authority, belief in and on which is not only reasonable but essential to any explanation, whether of man, the world, or God, that will answer the demands of reason itself. This may seem like at least a very harsh and offhand judgment pronounced upon a generally recognized competent philosopher; but it is simply the application to Professor Watson of his own pronouncement upon Newman when he says that in referring the view of Newman (concerning the Church as the medium between the soul and God—a view which the author misconceives) to his hidden assumption of the Church as an external authority necessary to help out the weakness of faith (where does Newman present such a view?): "I do not mean that he in any way tampered with the facts as he read them, but only that, *seeing them as he did, no other solution seemed to him open*" (p. 17). So, too (may we say *a pari?*), we do not mean that Dr. Watson in any way tampered with the facts (either regarding the ordinary Catholic doctrine or Newman's expressive theory on the relation of authority to faith), but only that, *seeing them as he did, no other solution seemed to him open.* In both cases it is a question of vision. But while we think that Professor Watson has failed to see distinctly the Catholic teaching on authority, and has therefore failed to disprove the necessity of authority as a motive of genuine faith in Christianity; while we do not think that he has contributed any new truth of positive value to a philosophy of religion, and much less to the reconstruction of religious belief; while moreover, we observe no little indistinctness in his thinking (*e. g.* the repeated confusion of faith as a subjective quality with faith as objective truth [pp. 13 ff.]), nevertheless we find much in the book to praise and commend. There are abundant indications of wide reading, and on the whole the criticisms are valuable because for the most part discriminating and objective. The thought is usually clear and the tone earnest and reverent. The book is one which the serious and discerning student may profit by reading. It may not be irrelevant to ask, in conclusion, why so cultured a writer as Dr. Watson will persist in calling the Catholic Church "Romish"?

ETUDES DE PHILOSOPHIE ET DE CRITIQUE RELIGIEUSES: FOI ET SYSTÈMES. Par E. Bernard Allo, O.P., Professeur à l'Université de Fribourg. Paris: Bloud et Cie. 1908. Pp. 302.

A number of articles contributed by Père Allo to various French reviews are here given the unification and permanence which they well deserve for their thought and style and temper. The safeguarding of vital faith amidst the warring systems that have recently been clamoring each for the exclusive right of interpreting is the author's primary object. He recognizes in these opposing camps a growing tendency toward moderation. The conservative exegetes and theologians are becoming less rigid and narrow, while the neo-critics and new-apologists are becoming less disdainful and acrimonious. Père Allo writes in the interests of peace. Discerning the elements of truth and strength as well as the excesses and weaknesses on both sides, he points out the lines and methods of conciliation. To the student who is looking for a means of orientation across the tangled field of philosophico-theological speculation we warmly recommend this book. The middle way is here the safest, but the termini of the divergent paths must not be forgotten. Both these needs are answered by the book — answered, too, so cleverly, so brightly, so good-naturedly that the pleasure of reading almost equals the instruction.

THE LIFE OF SAINT JEROME, the Great Doctor of the Church. In six books. From the original Spanish of the Reverend Father Fray José de Siguenza, 1595, by Mariana Monteiro. London: Sands & Co. 1907. Pp. 668.

A biography of the earliest and greatest interpreter of the Scriptures in the Western Church is of special interest at this time, when the extravagances of modern critical methods force the earnest student to a renewed examination of the claims to recognition among scholars which the traditional exegesis of the Christian Fathers has as a criterion and test of the inspired written truth. The revision of the Latin Vulgate by the Benedictine Fathers is sure to bring St. Jerome again into popular evidence, since we owe to him chiefly the preservation and faithful rendering not only of the "Hebraica Veritas," but also of the New Testament, which he translated from the Greek.

St. Jerome's career presents indeed a wonderful picture of

contrasts in character and activity. Nowhere else, amid the multiform variety of the lives of the Saints do we find his like. Impatient as a youth in his bold pursuit of all that his ardent imagination leads him to prize, he is docile as a child under the rule of his masters; ambitious to outdo the rhetoricians of Greece and Rome in their achievements of glory, he is yet willing at his baptism to forsake all for the love of Christ. Restlessly wandering in pursuit of knowledge from Italy to Germany, France, Spain, Greece, Egypt, and Asia Minor, he is ever consumed by the desire for solitude, and finds his only happiness in the desert of Chalais and in the lone recesses of the cave of Bethlehem. A lover of all that is beautiful in the art and letters of ancient Rome, he is possessed of a burning asceticism which spurns all that the classics adore, and carries on a warfare against the flesh which belies the admiration of the pagan poets for the creature comforts of life. Haughty in controversy, and merciless against the propagators of the modernism of his day, who made the writings of Origen their apology for schism and insubordination, we can hardly reconcile his temper with that evidently native and gentle thoughtfulness shown in his correspondence with numbers of the proudest patrician ladies of Rome. What is known of him is gleaned for the most part from his own writings and the letters of contemporaries; but it is enough to give us a vivid picture of him as largely influencing the history of his day. His early education in Rome, his departure after his baptism to Gaul and his friendship for Bonosus, his first visit to the Holy Land, his life in the Syrian desert, his studies of Hebrew, of theology, his ordination, his call as secretary to Pope Damasus, his studies of the Scripture, and his final retirement to Bethlehem, are pictures which receive a singular charm not merely from the personality of the Saint himself, but also from his associations with men and women of his day, each of whom lays claim to a history that renders them great in the eyes of the Church and the world.

The biography here offered in translation was written toward the end of the sixteenth century by a member of that once famous order of Hermits of St. Jerome whose magnificent monastery still forms a part of the Escurial of Madrid. It was republished in Spanish in 1853, and has been considered a classic on account of its style and the purity of its diction. The translator,

Mariana de Nautet Monteiro, who resides in England, is already well known by her numerous translations of popular works, religious and secular, not only from the Spanish, but from the Arabic and Portuguese. Of the fidelity of the rendering in the present instance we have no doubt; in truth, we believe the modern reader would relish the biography all the more if the translator had taken a little more liberty with the author's views, and given us the story substantially rather than literally as he told it. But archeology has its claims of reverence, and they would be urged here as an apology for adhering to the convictions of Fray José, even when he makes us believe that St. Jerome was a fully endowed Cardinal, who got his title, if he had it, from *cardia* (heart) and not, as we have always been inclined to believe, from *cardo*. These details are of minor importance, however, and can hardly interfere with the historical perspective which the author gives us in seven periods corresponding to seven ages, into which man's life is divided between infancy and the decrepitude of old age. The description is given in the manner of discourses setting forth the doings of the Saint in narrative and moral, with a "poem" serving as introduction to each group of discourses, in which the author shows no little taste for the ideals of the ancient classics. She employs them, as was the custom with St. Jerome himself, to adorn Christian principles, by substituting motives, for those of their writers, which lay beyond the reach of the pagan authors.

THE EARLY SCOTTISH CHURCH. Its Doctrine and Discipline. By Dom Columba Edmonds, Monk of Fort Augustus. With a Preface by the Right Rev. Æneas Chisholm. LL.D., Bishop of Aberdeen. London, Edinburgh: Sands & Co. St. Louis, Missouri: B. Herder. 1906. Pp. 306.

ANCIENT CATHOLIC HOMES OF SCOTLAND. By Dom Odo Blundell, O.S.B., Monk of Fort Augustus. With an Introduction by the Hon. Mrs. Maxwell Scott of Abbotsford. London: Burns & Oates. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers. 1907. Pp. 199.

The growth of the Church in Scotland since the abolition, little more than a century ago, of the penal code of William III, which made the profession of the Catholic faith a crime against the commonwealth, has been slow but very persistent. The number of clerics under Bishop Hay — a good proportion of whom were foreign missionaries, especially from France—hardly reached

forty. To-day there are nigh on to six hundred priests engaged on the Scottish mission, among them some distinguished converts from the ranks of the nobility and the higher professions. One of the principal centers of religious activity has been the monastery of Fort Augustus, the first Benedictine foundation in Scotland since the Reformation, where, only twenty years ago (1880) the first Plenary Council of the Scottish Church was assembled to give permanent direction to the work of ecclesiastical reconstruction, and where the two authors of the volumes under review, Dom Edmonds and Dom Blundell, write.

The history of the Scottish Church is a record to be proud of, and one to stimulate in its readers not only the sense of noble associations in the memory of its saintly heroes, but of ancient loyalty to Rome. We do not wholly agree with Dom Edmonds in accepting as conclusive proof of the early foundation of Scottish Christianity the testimony of names perpetuated in the patronal titles of churches or in the ancient Culdee Litany. Reasons for the special veneration of St. Victor and of St. Celestine, in the Scottish calendar, under the invocation of "Papa Romane," might very easily be found in the first, at least, of the two names, in the zeal with which Victor insisted upon the acceptance of the Roman liturgy and jurisdiction throughout the newly-established Churches, a measure which Celestine meant to enforce by the authority of his saintly predecessor in sending Germain of Auxerre to England. It is a matter of little importance, however, whether Marcus and Dionysius were actually sent to King Donald, or whether St. Ninian, somewhat later, brought the first tidings of the Gospel across the British borders into Caledonia. There is an intimate connexion between the early Scottish and the British as well as the Irish Church, which might well authorize the mutual tribute which the later missionaries paid to the founders of each.

Dom Edmonds's volume is no less a doctrinal exposition of the Roman Catholic faith held by the Scottish clergy than an historical sketch of the events that connect the apostolical age with our own time. His purpose is apologetic in the sense that he wishes to establish the claims of present-day Catholicism as the ancient faith of Scotland against the unfounded assertions of those who would vindicate the apostolicity of an established and popular Protestantism. Accordingly he traces the documentary

sources of the papal claim, the tradition regarding the Infallibility of the successor of St. Peter, the exercise of papal supremacy throughout the centuries, the testimony of the Fathers to the succession, back to the Bible proof of the principle and the doctrine of the Primacy. The second part of the work is more specifically historical; it tells the story of the early missions, the Councils, the labors of St. Ninian, St. Palladius, St. Patrick, the apostolates of St. Kentigern, St. Columba, St. Columbanus. The remainder of the volume is devoted to an exposition of the doctrine, discipline, liturgy, and ritual observances of the Scottish Church as evidenced in her symbolic books, her penitential code, and the ecclesiastical documents which throw light upon the traditional practice of the Celtic Church. The Paschal Controversy, the Ordination rite, veneration of Saints, Prayer for the Dead, Communion under one kind, Clerical Celibacy, and other distinctive observances of the Catholic Church, are dwelt upon as extant in Scotland from the earliest times. Brief references are given, throughout, to the sources whence the statements are taken.

A very interesting complement to the above volume is Dom Blundell's *Ancient Catholic Homes of Scotland.* Copiously and attractively illustrated, the book has all the charm of the old annals, correspondences, and personal reminiscences. Stories such as that which relates how the little Marquis of Huntley served Mass in St. Ninian's Church, within the cemetery dedicated to that Saint four miles from his home, or how Farmer Bennett's red waistcoat drove priest and people to flight from St. Margaret's, because it was mistaken for the red coat of the government's agent, graphic accounts of the steadfastness of the old chiefs to the Catholic faith, hold the attention of the reader amid the descriptions of persons and places, and give to these chronicles of the Scottish families and their devoted pastors an attraction that is not likely to be confined to the children of the "Leal Northern Land."

PARERGA: A companion volume to "Under the Cedars and the Stars." By Canon Sheehan, D. D., author of "My New Curate," "Luke Delmege," etc. New York, London, Bombay, Calcutta: Longmans Green, & Co. 1908. Pp. 352.

There is a wealth of entertaining wisdom brought together in these hundred paragraphs of reflections and readings, which make

this volume, like its predecessor, "Under the Cedars and the Stars," a precious panacea to dispel mental lethargy and to give the flagging energies after serious labor that tonic which is both pleasant and invigorating. Philosophy, science, ethics, theology, history, art, poetry, travel, reverie—all these in a variety of form and purpose are placed before the reader, who may take up as he likes, and for as long as he likes, any of the gems without danger of missing their reflecting rays or of breaking the chaplet whenever he may choose to lay the book down.

It is an ideal book for the student and priest; for while it offers recreation of mind, calculated to ennoble even while it delights, the reader is sure to absorb many truths and facts that would have escaped him in the ordinary course of observation, and the mastery of which constitutes the secret of that culture by which wise men purchase social influence as an opening to more serious achievement in the interests of truth and morality. To select any item from this literary tableau, in order to illustrate by example the beauty of the whole, would be as futile as if one desired to show forth the beauty of a mosaic by selecting some isolated blocks of pretty color from the whole. The charm lies no less in the variety and contrast of parts as in the individual worth of each thought or image or fact. Canon Sheehan is a master in this department of literary thought-composition, as he is in the sketching of Irish character and scenery.

SHORT SERMONS. By the Rev. F. P. Hickey, O. S. B. With Introduction by the Right Rev. J. C. Hedley, O. S. B., Bishop of Newport. Second Series. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers. 1906.

Father Hickey's *Sermons*, to the first series of which we called our readers' attention last year,[1] possess the twofold merit of being short and of containing a very satisfactory amount of solid thought, clearly set forth in the language which common people can readily understand and retain. Whilst the contents of the present volume cover the same complete ecclesiastical cycle which the author has illustrated by his first series of sermons, the instructions here given aim chiefly at inculcating the practice of frequent Communion, thus giving the priest new suggestions for the exposition of the epistles and gospels of the Sundays, as

[1] ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW, March, 1907, p. 340.

well as enabling him to lay special stress upon the compliance with the Decree of 1905 in which the Holy See counsels, if not enjoins, a universal return to the ancient practice of Communion at the daily Mass in our churches. Cardinal Logue pays a high tribute to the excellence of the sermons in a letter to the author.

IN THE SCHOOL OF SAINT FRANCIS. From the French of M. Paul Henry. By Imelda Chambers. London, Glasgow: R. & T. Washbourne; New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers. 1907.

This little volume puts the beauty and greatness of St. Francis before us in a form that makes easy the assimilation of the lessons of that singularly instructive life. It tells of his conversion, his sympathies and affections, his first intimate companions in the new work of self-denial, and his triumphs in death and after by the wondrous changes he wrought upon the sick who besought Divine mercy in his name. We venture to say that the story of the Seraphic Saint in this shape is likely to be read with pleasure by many who would shrink from the more serious task imposed by the larger biography.

THE QUEEN OF MAY. By the Rev. Placid Huault, S. M. Sydney: Louis Gille & Co.; Wellington, N. Z.: Dwyer & McFarlane; Westmead, Parramatta, N. S. W.; Whittaker Bros. (St. Vincent's Industrial Home Printing House). 1907. Pp. 247.

The substance of this series of thirty-one reflections may be found in the author's volume entitled *The Mother of Jesus.* But the matter is so arranged here that it presents the reader with a succession of images drawn from the life of Our Blessed Lady or from history in which she figures by her singular intervention. Thus, after a meditation or reading on "The Exterior of Mary," in which the doctrine and tradition of the Church are set forth, there follows the beautiful story of Bernadette to whom Our Lady appeared. So the meditation on "The Bitterness of Mary's Sorrows" is illustrated by the example of France; "The Death of Mary" by the "Death of a Child of Mary," and so forth. The book contains much that is itself new or put in a new form.

QUALITIES OF A GOOD SUPERIOR. Compiled chiefly from the Instructions of the Venerable Father Champagnat, Founder of the Little Brothers of Mary. Edited by the Rev. Ferreol Girardey, C.S.S.R. St. Louis, Mo., Freiburg (Baden): B. Herder. 1908. Pp. 295.

VORTRÄGE ÜBER GEISTLICHE THEMATA. Von P. Judde, S. J. Aus dem Französischen des Abbé Lenoir-Duparc. Regensburg, Rome, New York, Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet & Co. Pp. 388.

Superiors of Religious Communities will thank Fr. Girardey for having rendered accessible to them in English the excellent instructions which Father Champagnat periodically addressed to the Brother Directors of the Institute founded by him. These conferences were gathered together by his followers and published in the two works *Le bon Supérieur, ou les Qualités d'un bon Frère Directeur,* and in *Sentences, Lecons et Avis du Vén. Père Champagnat.* They contain much that is of value to both superiors and subjects possessing a just appreciation of what they owe to a prudent religious director who rules as well as governs. The qualities upon which the greatest stress is laid here are, in the first place, good judgment, next piety, regularity, solid virtue. These are supported by what the author calls "a good character," and unfolded in the exercise of such special virtues as charity, humility, meekness, firmness, knowledge, and watchfulness. The most difficult obligation which flows out of the last-mentioned quality of a good superior is the duty of correction. Hence the need of special precautions, on which the author dwells, in order to insure the success of correction. The art of making appointments, the fostering of vocations, and the special advantages which a faithful superior reaps from the difficulties of the position form separate chapters of instruction. In an Appendix, Fr. Girardey collects some useful hints bearing upon the same subject, and illustrated from the writings of eminent religious founders and spiritual directors, such as St. Ignatius, St. Alphonsus, Fathers Alvarez and Valuy.

The volume of *Vorträge* which we have placed under Father Girardey's volume is a series of practical instructions to novices and others who strive after religious perfection. We mention it in this connexion as a suggestion of apt material for translation. It is old wisdom put in new fashion, for the substance of these readings belongs to an old Theatine, P. Cheron, and it later on

furnished the Jesuit Father Judde with themes for the instruction of the religious whom he had to direct. The reflections on the principles of the spiritual life, the dangers of self-deception, detachment from family relations, the right measure of mortification compatible with proper care of one's health, the harm done by human respect, the cultivation of apostolical zeal, the habit of study, are topics which yield their fruit of spiritual advancement to the secular priest no less than to those who make special profession of religious poverty and obedience. Of all these things P. Judde's volume treats in a simple and practical way.

Literary Chat.

The semi-centenary celebration throughout the Catholic world of the Apparition of Our Lady of Lourdes has called forth poetic expression from many a gifted and loyal heart, and thus increased the beautiful story of "Mariana." Among the various collections of verses occasioned by the Jubilee celebration we note a prettily got up *recueil* entitled *Fleurs d'Églantier*, published by Casterman of Tournai (Belgium). It contains verses, by different writers, on the Apparition, the Miracles, and the Virgin Queen who is their chief subject. In some cases the words are accompanied by the melody in musical notation. Among the Monthlies the *Child of Mary* (St. Mary-of-the-Woods) has some unusually attractive selections which make the March number a special echo from Lourdes.

Out of Many Hearts is an appeal made in form principally of quotations from well-known writers to induce young men to consider the subject of religious vocation as a means to true peace and to usefulness in an elevated sphere of life. The invitation comes from a member of the Congregation of the Holy Cross which is doing splendid work chiefly as a teaching community, although not exclusively so. The Society, approved by the Holy See in 1857, originally consisted of two distinct communities —the Brothers of St. Joseph and a congregation of priests founded by Fr. Basil Moreau to serve as auxiliaries in populous and abandoned missions. A similar and well reasoned plea for the fostering of vocations as teachers was made some time ago in a pamphlet published by a member of the Brothers of the Christian Schools (De la Salle) in the diocese of Nashville. The clergy have a direct interest in the cultivation of vocations for our Scholastic Brotherhoods, for on their labor depends largely the product of that Catholic manhood whence religious freedom in the United States is to draw its permanency.

We have received *Nephilim* (giants) by William J. H. Bohannan, a book "written to show the error of 'science', and to point out the truth of the Scriptural statements concerning physical phenomena." The book hardly admits of serious criticism, for it does justice neither to the "science" which it impugns nor to the religion which it advocates; hence it must fail to produce any appreciable results. (Reeve A. Silk, New York.)

Paul Bourget places himself solidly on the side of the Church against the false Modernism of those who advocate "a new morality, a new church, a new gospel." He says: "To live, these men tell us, is to evolve. Exactly so; but it is also to endure. If we take evolution in its primitive and biological sense, it implies a change, but it also implies something that remains unchanged. In the hypothesis of Darwin, which is the idea followed by these moral evolutionists, we find that the evolution of a species is only intended to effect its conservation, that is to say, to safeguard certain essential organs which never can be changed, for, should they be changed, the end would not be evolution but death."

He applies the same principle as fundamental in the evolutionary process of society toward higher perfection. The factors which supply the elementary conditions of preservation in the development of the social organism are the institution of monogamy or marriage according to the Christian conception of family life, which includes the principle of marriage fidelity, and paternal authority with its complement of filial obedience. Of these factors the Church is the conserver and defender. By adherence to it we proclaim ourselves traditionalists. "This term is not at all a synonym for retrogression. No one retrogrades by proving the equality of triangles by the same method as was employed by the ancients. No one retrogrades by saying that two and two make four, as the first men who ever counted used to say. But he who says that a straight line is not the shortest way between two points, and that two and two make five, is a retrogressionist, indeed."

The successor of the late Ferdinand Brunetière here speaks as President of the General Association of the Catholic Students of Paris, warning young men against adopting the false principles of the Modernists whose philosophy must inevitably bring about the ruin of the most valuable factors of human life preserved for us by the Traditionalism of the Church. "You will not always be young," he says, "but if you will always be traditionalists you will avoid one of the most dangerous errors of our age, which the greatest intellects have in some cases failed to escape. The recent admirable Encyclical of the Holy Father on the subject of Modernism teaches us this. The error I refer to consists in believing that everything, even the most fundamental verities, must be subject to evolution. This is what is meant by the saying that we must keep abreast of our age, an exceedingly misleading expression; for it seems to mean that change is the sole condition of activity. It claims

to be the *Credo* of hope and of progress. Examine it well, and you will soon perceive that it is infinitely dangerous."

There are some wisely suggestive thoughts and happily expressed, in the salutatory article with which Professor Peabody introduces the recently established *Harvard Theological Review* (Quarterly, Macmillan & Co.). The seeming inopportuneness of launching a Journal of Theology could hardly be more powerfully contrasted with the now urging "call to Theology" than he has depicted it. The low ebb to which the theological tide has fallen on Protestant shores may not be paralleled within Catholic domains and the strong things he says concerning the maladjustment of the theological curriculum "to the new world of learning" may have for us no corresponding relevance. Not unprofitably, however, might the clerical educator take note of an element of possible experience such as the following. In consequence of certain "survivals in the theological curriculum many ministers of religion have found themselves trained in subjects which they cannot use and ignorant of much which they need to know, and as they take up their work in the world are inclined to lay down their theology. They become administrators of congregations, organizers of ecclesiastical industries, philanthropists, pastors, not theologians. Theology has presented itself to their minds as a record of controversies which were once living fires but are now extinct volcanoes, and they turn with a sense of relief to the fertile fields of modern life. The call of the time seems to them a call away from theology. They may even acquire a habit of mind quite distinct from that which characterizes a learned calling."

There is a certain grim humor in the words of the veteran scientist quoted by Professor Peabody: "Authors, clergymen, women, and charitable workers, whose ideals of duty are in some respects unquestionably higher than those of the world, are in general strangely blind to the obligations of debt and contract . . . Bankers do not like to deal with ladies or ministers or literary men." While recognizing some exaggeration in this indictment, especially in so far as the ethical weakness charged to the list of amiable persons just mentioned is attributed to the lack of "the scientific habit of mind," Dr. Peabody nevertheless allows that the indictment is not altogether without support. It can hardly be maintained, he admits, "that the traits of intellectual honesty—precision, reserve of statement, the weighing of words—are as conspicuous in ministers as in men of science or men of affairs."

It is wise in such matters to heed the advice of Thomas of Kempen: "Let not the authority of the writer offend thee . . . Attend to what is said." Whether or not his sermon be marked by "intellectual frugality," the preacher will not unwisely ask himself from time to time whether "the reason why many thoughtful people do not find spiritual advantage in listening to preachers" may not be that "the preaching gives them little to think about." The epigram that "a supply of priests cannot make

good a lack of prophets" may require some interpretation before application, but there is unequivocal directness in the further suggestion that "a time when people in an unprecedented degree are thinking can be guided by those only who can think straight and can report their thought with power."

But after one has followed Professor Peabody's strong and indeed thoroughly convincing plea for Theology, one is tempted to say *nego suppositum*, namely, that there is any Theology, or can be, in Protestantism. Much theological speculation there is indeed, and abundant evidence thereof is furnished by the very first number of this new *Review*, but no Theology in the sense of a science, that is, a system of conclusions based upon definitely ascertained and formulated principles, since in Protestantism there is and can be no such principles. Take, for instance, so elementary a truth as the divine omnipotence. To the question, is God omnipotent? probably the average Theist at least would answer in the affirmative, meaning by omnipotence an attribute in virtue whereof God can do whatever is possible, whatever is not self-contradictory. But turning to an on the whole thoughtful and well written article in the present number of the *Harvard Theological Review* we see this denied. For we read that "it is not in omnipotence to have men at all in this universe and not to have him first as a child or even as an untutored savage" (p. 121). Now we respectfully ask, is this a theological principle which Protestant theologians are willing to admit?

But it may be rejoined, *Medice, cura teipsum.* Is not "the Roman Catholic Church itself at this moment stirred by an agitation of free inquiry whose consequences may be as momentous as those of the Protestant Reformation"? Undoubtedly; but "the revision of Catholic theology which seems destined to occur" will be effected "within the Catholic Church" and not within the "synthesis of all heresies."

A propos of this topic, the Abbé Fontaine's *La Théologie du Noveau Testament et l'Evolution des Dogmes* (Lethielleux) spontaneously suggests itself. Those of the author's critics who have thought that in his previous works he had pointed out objectionable "infiltrations" where they did not exist, have found similar fault with his more recent book. Naturally of course the Abbé Fontaine's "conservatism" is not overliked by some of the more "advanced" exegetes. None the less is the *Theology of the New Testament* a scholarly, solid, and a timely production, well worth reading both by the Biblical and the theological student, especially if the reading be supplemented by Père Allo's *La Foi et Systèmes*, noticed in the Book Review of this issue. In the same connexion we may add Père Bourgeois' *Christianisme et Eglise* (Lethielleux). The main thesis here is that "integral Christianity exists in the Catholic Church alone"—a familiar statement of course for which one hardly looks for new arguments at this day. Nevertheless the author develops and illustrates it suggestively, in a way, however, that will be helpful to the lecturer and the general reader rather than the critic.

Books Received.

THEOLOGICAL AND DEVOTIONAL.

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A CATECHISM OF MODERNISM. Founded on the Encyclical *Pascendi Dominici Gregis* of His Holiness, Pope Pius X. Translated from the French of the Rev. J. B. Lemius, O.M.I., at St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, N. Y. New York: Society for the Propagation of the Faith. 1908. Pp. 155.

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